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STRUCTURAL RACISM AGAINST BLACK AMERICAN 
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“A definite purpose, like blinders on a horse, inevitably 
narrows its possessor’s point of view.” ~ Robert Frost 
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INTRODUCTION 
From its beginnings, adoption in the United States 
centered on the precept of “the best interests of the child.”1 
The international community has also embraced this 
position, 2 incorporating the “best interests” tenet into the 
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Inter-country Adoption (“Hague 
Convention” or “Hague”), a multilateral treaty established to 
avoid corruption in international adoption practices. 3  
Agreeing that “the best interests of the child should be the 
paramount principle governing the placement of children 
outside their biological families,” the Hague Convention 
includes a subsidiarity principle that emphasizes domestic 
placement as a child’s best interest and allows for 
international adoption only as a last-resort measure.4  As a 
 
 1. Ruth-Arlene Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices: Serving Whose 
Interests?, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING 
FAMILIES 86 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010).  Beginning with the first 
adoption law passed in Massachusetts in 1851, adoption evolved as “both a state 
judicial process and a specialized child welfare service to promote the so-called 
best interests of children in need of permanent homes.”  Id. (citing 
Massachusetts Act to Provide for the Adoption of Children, Mass. Rev. Stat. ch. 
324 (Supp. 1851)); SIGNE HOWELL, THE KINNING OF FOREIGNERS: 
TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 163–65 (2006).  Over the 
next twenty-five years, fifteen states enacted laws similar to Massachusetts 
that stressed the best interests of the child.  See Michele Bratcher Goodwin, 
Baby Markets, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING 
FAMILIES 3 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010). 
 2. Jini L. Roby et al., Social Justice and Intercountry Adoptions: The Role 
of the U.S. Social Work Community, 58 SOC. WORK 295, 300 (2013), available at 
http://globalfop.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/social-justice-and-intercountry-
adoption_-the-role-of-us-social-work.pdf.  Although not defined by the Hague 
Convention, the Guide to Good Practice by the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law suggests that best interests considerations should include 
“the individual, familial, cultural, and social contexts of the proposed adoption 
[which] should be individualized and contextualized to take into account the 
child’s entire environment and existing relationships.”  Id. 
 3. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th 
Session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134, 1134–46 
[hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 4. Id. at 1139–40 art. 4(b); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: 
ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 94 (1993) 
[hereinafter BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS]. 
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current partner to the Hague Convention, the United States, 
through the State Department, closely monitors non-
compliant countries and will ultimately shut down adoptions 
from countries whose systems do not adapt to Hague norms 
and thus do not serve the best interests of children.5 
In recent years, the United States has become known as 
the largest “receiving country” for international adoptions, 
bringing in nearly a quarter of a million children of other 
races and nationalities.6  The globalization of the adoption 
industry has changed the racial make-up of the American 
family and led to a more culturally diverse population.  But, 
despite the increase in racially diverse families, the United 
States is certainly not colorblind in its approach to adoption.  
The well-known secret within the adoption community is that 
adoptive preferences follow a racial hierarchy.  Race is still 
negatively incorporated into the cost of private adoptions, as 
industry standards continue to value black American 
children7 less than their lighter counterparts.  According to 
one adoption agency director, the “adoption hierarchy” is 
reflective of a racist society that places—with corresponding 
monetary values—blonde, blue-eyed girls at the top and black 
boys at the bottom.8  This “evidence of racial hierarchy in the 
adoption market” suggests that racism has not been 
eradicated from American society, and the nation is not yet as 
 
 5. For example, adoptions from Guatemala were shut down in 2007 when 
officials learned that U.S. demand led to coercion and kidnapping of children.  
Kevin Voigt, International Adoption: Saving Orphans or Child Trafficking?, 
CNN.COM (Sept. 18, 2013),  http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-
adoption-saving-orphans-child-trafficking/. 
 6. Peter Selman, Intercountry Adoption as Globalized Motherhood, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD: DECONSTRUCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS 
OF BIOLOGY AND CARE 89 (Wendy Chavkin & JaneMaree Maher eds. 2010).  
Families in the United States adopted approximately 250,000 children from 
other countries over the last fifteen years, Intercountry Adoption: Statistics, 
U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2015).  Roughly the same number of children have aged out of the 
United States foster care system unadopted in that same time period.  See Gary 
Stangler, Aging Out of Foster Care: The Costs of Doing Nothing Affect Us All, 
HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (July 28, 2013 12:59 pm), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-stangler/aging-out-of-foster-care-
_b_3658694.html. 
 7. To eliminate confusion, the term “black” is used to refer to black and 
biracial Americans born in the United States, while the term African signifies 
children adopted from Africa. 
 8. Anne-Marie O’Neill, Why Are American Babies Being Adopted Abroad?, 
PEOPLE (June 6, 2005), http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,201477 
46,00.html (quoting Adoption-Link Director Margaret Fleming). 
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colorblind as some would like to believe.9  As parents seek 
children from abroad, more than 100,000 American children 
still await adoption in the United States foster care system, 
with minorities disproportionately represented and “aging 
out” of the system.10  Almost a quarter of a million children 
have aged out in the last fifteen years, nearly the same 
number of children that Americans have adopted through 
international adoption in the same time period.11 
What is less known is that the United States is also a 
“sending country,” as it allows the international adoption of 
its black and biracial children, many from foster care.12  The 
United States does not follow the adopted children’s progress, 
so the little data that exists on these children is inaccurate at 
best.  But the State Department’s figures on the number of 
children sent are much lower than the numbers of children 
reportedly received by Western European and Canadian 
governments, suggesting the United States underreports the 
number of minority children it sends abroad.13  As reports of 
the practice have emerged, so has a consensus that the 
“emphasis should be in finding children good homes here, not 
shipping them out of the country.”14  Yet the United States 
currently allows Americans to ignore the Hague’s subsidiarity 
principle and participate in either Hague or non-Hague-
compliant international adoptions, creating a two-system 
approach to international adoption for its own citizens while 
requiring other countries to adhere to Hague Convention 
protocols.15 
 
 9. See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoption, 
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1415, 1471 (2006). 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ADOPTION AND FOSTER 
CARE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING SYSTEM REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2013 
ESTIMATES 1 (July 2014), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport22.pdf [hereinafter 2014 
AFCARS Report]; Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1452. 
 11. Intercountry Adoption: Statistics, supra note 6; Stangler, supra note 6; 
Wilhelmina A. Leigh et al., Aging Out of the Foster Care System to Adulthood: 
Findings, Challenges, and Recommendations, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND 
ECON. STUDIES HEALTH POLICY INST. (Dec. 2007), 
http://www.blackadministrators.org/pdf/Aging_Out_of_the_Foster_Care_SystemF
INAL.pdf. 
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
 13. See id. 
 14. O’Neill, supra note 8 (quoting Roots Adoption Agency CEO Toni Oliver). 
 15. France also allows this unique situation.  All other Hague signatory 
countries allow international adoptions only among member countries.  
Elizabeth Willmott Harrop, Adopting from Africa, Saving the Children?, THINK 
2015] IGNORING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE 265 
Many well-meaning adoptive parents “believe that the 
myth of color-blindness can somehow deflect the realities of a 
racist society,” even as they adopt children of color from other 
nations. 16   But as black American children are either 
bypassed in favor of more “exotic” African children, or have to 
go overseas to find a home, some have boldly called the 
international adoption practice “covert racism.” 17   As one 
reporter observed, “The irony of one of the world’s wealthiest 
nations exporting its own children has not gone unnoticed.  
For many, it raises questions about identity, race and the 
tangled legacy of American slavery,” answered partly by “this 
country’s tortured racial politics.”18   
This Article begins in Part I by tracing the evolution of 
“color-blind” thought from America’s racist beginnings to the 
“post-racial” America that was supposedly ushered in with 
President Obama’s election.  This section highlights Derrick 
Bell’s interest convergence theory that suggests that 
colorblindness was co-opted to satisfy white concerns and 
explains how colorblindness has instead given way to “color-
blind racism.”  Part II argues that, as with colorblindness, the 
best interests standard has been co-opted through 
international adoption to serve the desires of white 
prospective parents.  It examines the Hague Convention’s 
purposes, emphasizes the subsidiarity provision that calls for 
international adoption only as a last-resort measure, and 
notes that the U.S. currently allows its citizens to adopt from 
 
AFRICA PRESS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://thinkafricapress.com/legal/adoption-trade-
sets-shop-africa. 
 16. Lisa Ko, Baby Rescue or Baby Factory?, PBS (May 19, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/culture/baby-rescue-or-baby-factory/774/ 
(quoting from a telephone conversation with Professor Michele Goodwin, editor 
of Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families); see also 
KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS: RESCUE, TRAFFICKING, AND THE NEW 
GOSPEL OF ADOPTION 136 (2013) (citing a report from the African Child Policy 
Forum that adoptions from Africa increased threefold from 2003 to 2010). 
 17. Globalization has been defined as “the growing interpenetration of 
states, markets, communications, and ideas across borders” and is a hallmark of 
modern society.  Alison Brysk, Introduction: Transnational Threats and 
Opportunities, in GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2002). 
 18. Gabrielle Glaser, Sending Black Babies North, THE OREGONIAN (July 4, 
2004), at L05, available at http://gabrielleglaser.com/files/articles/the-oregonian-
sending-black-babies-north-gabrielle-glaser.pdf; O’Neill, supra note 8; see also 
David Smolin, Intercountry Adoption as Child Trafficking, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
281, 287 (2004) [hereinafter Smolin, Child Trafficking] (arguing that modern 
adoption practices resemble the purchase of human beings, which is analogous 
to slavery practices). 
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countries that are both Hague- and non-Hague-compliant.  It 
also examines the recently-proposed Children in Families 
First Act, 19  which sought to facilitate more incoming 
international adoptions, even as black American children are 
sent away for foreign adoption.  Part III discusses how the 
current two-system international adoption approach furthers 
structural racism against black American children, as black 
American children disproportionately languish in, and age 
out of, foster care with negative outcomes. 
The Article closes with the stance that allowing the 
current two-tiered system of international adoption to 
continue is inconsistent with the Hague Convention.  As a 
matter of public policy, the United States should enforce, for 
all adoptions, the proviso within the Hague Convention that 
allows for international adoption only if all avenues for intra-
country adoption have been exhausted and there are no 
children available for adoption within the United States.  The 
United States should not be disposing of its own available 
black children, sending them away to other countries for 
adoption, and then replacing them with children, of any color, 
from other nations. 
I. RACE AND COLORBLINDNESS IN AMERICA 
Dr. W.E.B. DuBois once remarked, “The problem of the 
twentieth century is the problem of the color line.”20  It was a 
line that separated black and white in almost every form of 
American society—a “hangover” from the days of slavery, 
according to Justice Hugo Black21—with such a depth of 
racism that historian M.I. Finley argued that not “[e]ven 
emancipation and over a century of freedom” could remove its 
stigma. 22 That is because in America, where “[b]y law, every 
 
 19. Children in Families First Act of 2014, S. 2475, 113th Cong. (2014); 
Children in Families First Act of 2013, S. 1530, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 20. W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903). 
 21. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 54 (2001). 
 22. Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American 
Legal Development, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1009, 1012, 1016 (1993) (citing M.I. 
FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 11 (1980)).  A recent study 
showed that slavery, although banned more than a century ago, continues to 
influence racial attitudes, particularly in the former slave states.  Avidit 
Acharya et al., The Political Legacy of American Slavery (Oct. 18, 2013), 
http://www.mattblackwell.org/files/papers/slavery.pdf; Legacy of Slavery Still 
Fuels Anti-Black Attitudes in the Deep South, U. ROCHESTER (Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://www.rochester.edu/news/show.php?id=7202. 
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negro [was] presumed to be a slave,” race was the sole 
determinant of who was free and who was subject to 
slavery.23 
Progress, though slow, was made, and many Americans 
now subscribe to colorblindness and a belief that 
discrimination has all but disappeared; indeed, charges of 
racism or discrimination are often considered “as excuses or 
as minorities playing the infamous ‘race card.’ ” 24   Thus, 
“racism” has become one of the new “taboo” words, and the 
very mention of race is often seen as “race baiting.”25  Even 
so, recent events have demonstrated that the nation has not 
attained the color-blind status it proclaims and racial 
tensions persist amidst adherence to post-racial thought.26 
 
 23. Finkelman, supra note 22, at 1012–16. 
 24. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva & David Dietrich, The Sweet Enchantment of 
Color-Blind Racism in Obamerica, 634 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 190, 
194 (2011). 
 25. Kenneth B. Nunn, The “R-Word”: A Tribute to Derrick Bell, 22 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 433–34 (2011).  “Just as racism and the expression of 
racially prejudiced sentiments have become taboo, the word ‘racism’ and the 
imputation to others of racially prejudiced sentiments are becoming taboo.  As 
the Daily Show reported in August: ‘The race card’s maxed out.’”  Id. (quoting 
James Taranto in the Wall Street Journal).  See also Jack Mirkinson, Megyn 
Kelly Defends Her Santa Comments, Attacks Critics For “Race Baiting,” 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/14/m 
egyn-kelly-defends-santa-comments_n_4443619.html. 
 26. Race was recently brought to the forefront of American conversation 
when a white police officer was not indicted after he fatally shot Michael Brown, 
an unarmed black teenager, in Ferguson, Missouri, which has a two-thirds 
black population but nearly all-white police force.  Monica Davey & Julie 
Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-
shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html?_r=0; see also Violence in Ferguson: 
Police Fire Tear Gas, Smoke Bombs at Demonstrators, ABC NEWS (Aug. 14, 
2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/violence-ferguson-police-fire-smoke-bombs-
tear-gas/story?id=24973522.  Less than one month later, protests ensued after a 
Staten Island grand jury refused to indict a white officer who had placed an 
unarmed black man in a deadly chokehold. J. David Goodman & Al Baker, 
Waves of Protest After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner 
Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/0 
4/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-deat 
h-of-eric-garner.html. Both events followed the acquittal of charges of second-
degree murder and manslaughter against George Zimmerman, a “white 
Hispanic” who shot Trayvon Martin, a “suspicious” hoodie-clad black youth 
armed only with a drink and candy Skittles.  Becky Bratu, From Scorn to 
Gratitude, Mixed Reactions to Obama’s Remarks on Zimmerman Verdict, 
NBCNEWS.COM (July 19, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/1 
9/19564830-from-scorn-to-gratitude-mixed-reactions-to-obamas-remarks-on-zim 
merman-verdict?lite. His verdict was met with protests across the nation and 
expressions of shock and rage against “a nonstop debate about the degree to 
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A. Colorblindness as an Aspirational Goal 
Many scholars point to Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy 
v. Ferguson 27 as the beginning of what has been termed 
“color-blind” racial theory.28  Homer Plessy had challenged 
the constitutionality of an 1890 Louisiana statute that 
required railway companies to maintain “equal but separate” 
accommodations for “colored” passengers after he was forcibly 
removed from a train for refusing to vacate a passenger car 
intended for whites only. 29   Justice Brown authored the 
majority opinion and concluded that separate but equal was a 
constitutionally acceptable standard. 30   Affording great 
discretion to the Louisiana legislature to determine the 
reasonableness of its own actions, Justice Brown maintained 
that appropriate divisions could be based on the color of one’s 
skin and rejected the argument that “the enforced separation 
of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority.”31  Such lawful segregation, according to Justice 
Brown, did “not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race 
to the other,” but was an assumption that the colored race 
had stamped upon itself.32  Therefore, in his view, the State of 
Louisiana could enact a law that required the separation of 
the races, one of whom had just endured more than 100 years 
 
which race played a role in the shooting and in the trial.”  Jon Cohen & Dan 
Balz, Race Shapes Zimmerman Verdict Reaction, WASH. POST (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/race-shapes-zimmerman-verdict-reactio 
n/2013/07/22/3569662c-f2fc-11 e2-8505-bf6f231e77b4_story.html. 
 27. 163 U.S. 537, 540–42 (1896). 
 28. See id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 537, 540–42.  Plessy challenged the law, originally entitled the 
“Separate Car Act,” which provided for “separate railway carriages for the white 
and colored races” under both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id.  
Plessy was only one-eighth black; the opinion noted “that the mixture of colored 
blood was not discernible in him.”  Id. at 541. 
 30. Id.  Justice Brown discounted the idea that the Louisiana law at issue 
implicated the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and was 
intended to prevent “the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that 
constitute badges of slavery or servitude.”  Id. at 542–43, 551–52.  Setting the 
tone for the entire opinion, he insisted that the statute imposed a mere legal 
distinction between the two races based on color, but did nothing to make them 
unequal or reinstate slavery.  Id. at 543.  Nor would Justice Brown find that the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from making or enforcing laws 
that deny equal protection to all citizens, provided a basis on which to 
invalidate the Louisiana law.  Id. at 544. 
 31. Id. at 551. 
 32. Id. at 544, 551.  “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the 
act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”  
Id. 
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of slavery at the hand of the other, based solely on the color of 
its skin.  And if the formerly indentured race felt slighted by 
the law, it was solely because it chose to feel inferior by the 
seemingly equal act,33 created by people from the subjugating 
race.34 
Dissenting, Justice Harlan advanced that the separation 
of citizens solely on the basis of race was “a badge of servitude 
wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality 
before the law established by the constitution,” which could 
not be justified “upon any legal grounds.”35  He warned that 
the Louisiana statute, and the majority’s construction of it, 
allowed “the seeds of race hate to be planted under the 
sanction of law,” which merely served to create a caste system 
of “legal inferiority” based solely on the color of one’s skin.36  
In his view, the Fourteenth Amendment provided legal effect 
that all stood equal under the Constitution, “without regard 
to race.”37  Even if more aspirational than descriptive, Justice 
Harlan declared that “Our Constitution is color-blind, and 
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”38 
The Supreme Court was called upon six times in the 
aftermath of Plessy to untangle applications of the “separate 
 
 33. Id.  According to Justice Brown, even if it were the case that the law 
caused some slight, it was not the job of the Court to change it.  Plessy, 163 U.S. 
at 551–52.  Justice Brown wrote: 
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish 
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so 
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.  
If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be 
inferior to the other civilly or politically.  If one race be inferior to the 
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them 
upon the same plane. 
Id. 
 34. During Reconstruction, several black politicians served in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, and P. B. S. Pinchback served as Louisiana governor 
from late 1872 to January, 1873.  However, following the removal of federal 
troops from that state in 1877, black politicians became a rarity again.  Nikki 
Brown, Jim Crow/Segregation, KNOWLA ENCYCLOPEDIA LA. (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.knowla.org/entry/735/. 
 35. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559, 562. 
 36. Id. at 557–58, 560, 563.  Plessy’s counsel raised the issue as to how far 
race-based laws could be taken, i.e., what prohibited the legislature from 
enacting “laws requiring colored people to walk upon one side of the street, and 
white people upon the other, or requiring white men’s houses to be painted 
white, and colored men’s black, or their vehicles or business signs to be of 
different colors,” an exaggerated, but prescient observation of the segregated 
Jim Crow America to come.  Id. at 549. 
 37. Id. at 556, 559–60. 
 38. Id. at 559. 
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but equal” doctrine in the field of public education.39  Using 
tortured reasoning to reach predictable results, the Court 
found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require 
integration into the white schools of Mississippi,40 nor did it 
require taxpayers in Georgia to take money away from a high 
school for whites to “establish and maintain a high school for 
colored children.”41  These cases simply moved the passenger 
train analysis into the classroom; neither case challenged the 
actual separate but equal doctrine. 42  In time, the Court 
looked beyond the actual facilities and focused on the 
“intangible benefits” that separate settings could not 
provide. 43   Still, of those six cases, none challenged the 
separate but equal doctrine, except Sweatt v. Painter, which 
acknowledged the issue but left it for another day.44 
That day came when public schoolchildren in four states 
challenged their schools’ maintenance of segregated, but 
equal, facilities.45  NAACP lawyer Thurgood Marshall argued 
that segregation into “separate educational facilities” based 
solely on race was “inherently unequal,” and, finally, the 
Court agreed.46  Tracing school development since Plessy, the 
Court noted the dominant place that public education had 
come to be afforded in modern society. 47   Given schools’ 
preeminence in the function of state and local governments, 
the Court underscored the fact that once the states “had 
undertaken to provide [the right of education, it] must be 
 
 39. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 (1954). 
 40. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927). 
 41. Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). 
 42. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 491. 
 43. Id. at 491–92 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–34 (1950); 
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641–42 (1950); Mo. ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 345 (1938)).  At the graduate level, the Court 
found that qualified black students who were made to attend separate 
educational facilities were denied equality with white students.  Id. 
 44. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636.  NAACP Legal Defense 
and Education Fund attorney Thurgood Marshall, arguing for the petitioner in 
Sweatt and in Brown v. Board, invoked Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy in his 
brief to the Court, arguing that “classifications and distinctions based on race or 
color have no moral and legal validity in our society. They are contrary to our 
constitution and laws.”  Ian F. Haney Lopez, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the 
“Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 809 (2011). 
 45. Brown, 347 U.S. at 486–87, 492 n.9 (involving children from Kansas, 
Virginia, Delaware, and South Carolina). 
 46. Id. at 493, 495. 
 47. Id. at 492–93. 
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made available to all on equal terms.”48  The Court noted that 
the children’s facilities were indeed equal “with respect to 
buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, 
and other ‘tangible’ factors.”49  However, the Court looked 
beyond the tangible to “the effect of segregation itself on 
public education.” 50   In reaching its decision, the Court 
referenced several psychological studies that showed that 
segregation based solely on race stamped children with a 
badge of inferiority sanctioned by law.51  Resonating with, 
although not referring to, Judge Harlan’s dissent in Plessy,52 
the Court declared that such law-sanctioned segregation, 
“denoting the inferiority of the negro group” and 
detrimentally impacting the children, could not stand.53  The 
Court had finally made steps towards colorblindness, at least 
in the area of school segregation.54 
B. Co-opting Colorblindness to Keep the Status Quo 
Colorblindness means that color should no longer be a 
basis of discrimination where “a majority oppresses a racially-
defined minority.”55  The slate should be wiped clean, and all 
should be equal and on the same footing.  If Plessy ushered in 
more than half a century of legalized racism, Brown v. Board 
provided the impetus for a civil rights movement that actively 
sought to end all vestiges of racism in American society.56  
 
 48. Id. at 493. 
 49. Id. at 492.  The highest courts in Kansas, Virginia, Delaware, and South 
Carolina had each declared the separate schools were either equal in every way 
or were in the process of being equalized.  Id. at 486–87, 492 n.9. 
 50. Id. at 492. 
 51. Id. at 494. 
 52. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 205.  The Court did not refer to Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy and “did not proclaim that the Constitution was color-
blind.”  Id. at xxiii, 68. 
 53. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 54. While the Court paved the way for desegregation by prohibiting 
discrimination, it did not expressly require integration.  See Lopez, supra note 
44, at 809–10 n.8 (citing Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind 
Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 234 (2008) (recording a colloquy wherein 
Marshall sought to reassure a hesitant Justice Frankfurter that the NAACP 
was “not asking for affirmative relief,” but only for an end to “state-imposed 
segregation.”)); see also Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (1955) (per 
curiam) (“The Constitution . . . does not require integration. . . . It merely 
forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation.”). 
 55. William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: 
An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 11 (2011–12). 
 56. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 71 (quoting Fisk University President 
Charles Johnson) (“If segregation is unconstitutional in educational 
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While Thurgood Marshall and the NAACP struggled for 
racial equality through the courts, citizens engaged in non-
violent acts of civil disobedience to show the unjustness of 
segregation. 57   Students “sat-in” at segregated lunch 
counters,58 and Rosa Parks refused to give up a seat at the 
front of a bus reserved only for whites, leading others to do 
the same. 59   Men, women, and children paraded on city 
streets and bridges, and they marched on the mall in 
Washington;60 almost every stride was met with violence and 
resistance.61 
1. Restrictive v. Structural Racism 
Under a traditional or restrictive-racism construct, 
racism is identified by the intentionally harmful conduct by 
conscious and deliberate racists.62  Rooted in the actor’s dual 
beliefs of personal superiority and the targeted person’s 
inferiority because of particular characteristics, the 
traditional or restrictive form of racism requires a showing of 
intentional discrimination.63  In other words, racist behavior 
is not unconscious; the actor deliberately takes action, intent 
on causing a particular result that he believes his victim 
deserves.64  It requires “conscious volition,” or a showing of 
intent—the actor must consciously act on a racist belief to 
 
institutions, it is no less so unconstitutional in other aspects of our national 
life.”); see also Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit 
of Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1412 
(1995) (claiming that Brown “raised black expectations for an all-embracing 
society.”); Aldon Morris, Centuries of Black Protest: Its Significance for America 
and the World, in RACE IN AMERICA 46 (Herbert Hill & James Jones, Jr. eds., 
1993) (claiming that Brown enabled blacks to believe that the “entire edifice of 
Jim Crow” could be dismantled); E.W. Kenworthy, Civil Rights Bill—Why It Is 
Taking So Long, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 1964), at E12 (proclaiming that Brown 
“stands as the great turning point in the battle for civil rights.”). 
 57. Early civil rights groups such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) 
and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) drew from the nonviolence 
teachings of Mohandas Gandhi and sought change through nonviolent mass 
resistance.  RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS 23, 59 (2006).  Employing 
nonviolent civil disobedience tactics, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. became the 
recognized leader of the civil rights movement.  PHILIP ABBOTT, POLITICAL 
THOUGHT IN AMERICA 301–02, 309–12 (1991). 
 58. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 120–21. 
 59. ARSENAULT, supra note 57, at 57–58. 
 60. ABBOTT, supra note 57, at 312. 
 61. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 37, 87. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Wiecek, supra note 55, at 4. 
 64. Id. 
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bring about the intended action. 
For example, the Ku Klux Klan members who killed and 
stuffed into an earthen dam three young civil rights workers 
for registering Southern blacks to vote, acted on their racist 
beliefs to cause the particular outcome.65  The same is true of 
the church bombers who stole the lives of four little black 
girls attending Sunday school at a Birmingham church,66 and 
those who bombed the buses and then beat the “Freedom 
riders” who traveled into the Deep South on interstate buses 
to challenge unconstitutionally segregated transportation 
facilities.67  As did those responsible for beating, shooting, 
and throwing into the Tallahatchie River a young black 
teenager who reportedly whistled at a white woman,68 and 
Birmingham Commissioner of Public Safety Eugene “Bull” 
Connor who loosed vicious dogs and turned high-pressure 
water hoses on peaceful marchers, including children.69 
In the face of such blatant racism, the tide of public 
sentiment slowly turned in sympathy towards the peaceful 
protestors.70  However, as the Civil Rights Movement made 
gains, social thought evolved to include a bad-actor 
philosophy.71  Only those who employed measures like the 
above were considered to be racist, and the restrictive racism 
construct came to include only “the most overtly bigoted.”72 
Structural racism, on the other hand, does not need a bad 
 
 65. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 130. 
 66. Id. at 123. 
 67. ARSENAULT, supra note 57, at 143–48.  Organized by the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE), the 1947 Journey of Reconciliation became the first 
organized “Freedom Ride” as it sought to enforce the provisions of Morgan v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), a ruling which invalidated as 
unconstitutional a Virginia statute that required segregation of interstate bus 
passengers, but was largely ignored in the South.  Id. at 19–21. 
 68. See Barbara Schwabauer, The Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime 
Act: The Cold Case of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 71 OHIO STATE 
L.J. 653, 655 (2010); PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 86. 
 69. Foster Hailey, Dogs and Hoses Repulse Negroes at Birmingham, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 4, 1963), at A1. 
 70. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 123.  Compare Walker v. City of 
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (characterizing the Birmingham marchers as 
a disorderly mob who displayed an impatient commitment to their cause) with 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (describing the same 
marchers as an organized group with defined leadership, whose peaceful 
enjoyment of their freedoms should not be contingent upon the uncontrolled will 
of an official who denied them free exercise of their constitutional rights) 
(Stewart, J., both opinions). 
 71. Nunn, supra note 25, at 436. 
 72. Wiecek, supra note 55, at 10. 
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actor.  It results when a society systemically favors one group 
over another, leading to segregation, denial of opportunity, 
and racially-disparate outcomes for the disfavored group.73  
Also known as institutional racism, it reinforces a “racial 
hierarchy of status” that results in the “social domination” of 
one group over another.74  For example, structural racism 
advances that racism against blacks was so rooted in 
American society, i.e., it was part of the structural makeup, 
that changing the actions of a few bad actors still did not 
affect all the racially-based negative outcomes for the 
subjugated group.75  In other words, structural racism exists 
despite intent, because a model of society that associates 
certain races with negative stereotypes will feed implicit 
biases that produce unconscious racism, even in the absence 
of blatantly racist actions.76 
2. Bell’s Interest Convergence Theory 
According to critical race theorist Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
racism is such a permanent part of American culture that 
rather than trying to change individual beliefs one bad actor 
at a time (an impossible task), the whole structure of society 
must change to eliminate racism. 77   In his “Interest-
Convergence” thesis, Bell suggested that racism would be 
eliminated only if the entire social structure of America 
changed in a manner palatable to the majority.78  In other 
words, racial equality takes place only when “it converges 
with the interests of whites,” or, stated differently, 
institutional changes and social policy advancements are 
made only when whites collectively benefit.79 
 
 73. Id. at 5–6. 
 74. Id. at 6 (citing Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial 
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1810 
(2000)). 
 75. Nunn, supra note 25, at 435. 
 76. Wiecek, supra note 55, at 7–8 (citing, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristen Lane, 
Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
465, 473 (2010); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 
94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 970–71 (2006)). 
 77. Nunn, supra note 25, at 435. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  “Interest convergence theory therefore rejects the notions of classical 
legal theory that idealism, abstract legal doctrine, or the deployment of novel 
legal strategies will bring about significant advances in civil rights.  While all of 
these may play a role, interest convergence theory holds that it is the actual or 
perceived alignment of the interests of the elite with those of the subordinated 
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Further, Bell advanced that structural racism hides 
behind “the illusion of colorblindness and neutrality,”80 and 
suggested that racism continually reinvents itself—much as 
the character from Catch Me if You Can continuously 
reinvented his persona from pilot to doctor to prosecutor—to 
escape notice and continue course.81  Bell believed that racism 
would co-opt and appropriate any threatening movement or 
ideology as its own and, as one such example, pointed to 
Brown v. Board of Education’s holding that “separate but 
equal” was inherently unconstitutional.82  According to Bell, 
Brown reframed the narrative that “equality and fairness 
finally triumphed in both law and public opinion over the 
forces of intolerance.”83  Instead, Bell argued that Brown was 
actually driven by geopolitical concerns and happened only 
because it converged with the interests of white elites.84  After 
all, blacks had been arguing against “separate but equal” for 
years to no avail.85  Public sentiment regarding desegregation 
in 1954 certainly had not changed.86  Why the sudden shift 
from a doctrine to which the Court had so doggedly 
adhered?87 
The answer, according to Bell, was not so much the 
concern for the injured schoolchildren, or “those concerned 
about the immorality of racial inequity,” as it was concern by 
 
that is outcome determinative in achieving substantive justice.”  William M. 
Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges 
and Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV. 21, 23 (2011). 
 80. Wiecek, supra note 55, at 6–7, 13–14. 
 81. See Nunn, supra note 25, at 435; see also CATCH ME IF YOU CAN 
(DreamWorks 2002) (chronicling the exploits of con artist Frank Abagnale, Jr., 
who used different personas to escape detection). 
 82. 347 U.S. 483, 491 (1954); Nunn, supra note 25, at 435–36. 
 83. Nunn, supra note 25, at 435–36. 
 84. Carter, supra note 79, at 23; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 
(1980). 
 85. Bell, supra note 84, at 524 (citing Roberts v. City of Bos., 5 Cush. 198, 
206 (1849)). 
 86. Id. at 525–26. 
 87. “The NAACP had been litigating school desegregation cases for decades, 
losing each time, or winning, at best, very narrow victories. Then, in 1954, the 
skies opened. The Supreme Court of the United States held, for the first time in 
a school desegregation case, that separate is never equal.” Carter, supra note 
79, at 24 (quoting Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas 
and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 41 
(2006); Richard Delgado, Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American 
Fortunes–Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 369, 372–73 (2002)). 
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white elites in how the United States was perceived in a post-
war world. 88  The abandonment of segregation needed to 
happen because whites in policymaking positions could not 
advance the principles of equality and freedom in their 
foreign policy efforts against Communism when racial strife 
existed at home.89  Bell pointed to black servicemen returning 
from World War II who became discontent with racial 
prejudice at home after experiencing a different world 
abroad.90  It was hard to expand the creed “all men are 
created equal” to third-world countries when democracy did 
not extend to the nation’s black men who fought for that very 
principle.91  So, instead, whites co-opted the movement for 
equality with Board v. Brown and lessened the threat.92 
Even if Bell was incorrect that Brown v. Board’s lip 
service to colorblindness and equality was co-opted merely to 
satisfy foreign interests, the fact remains that no matter the 
reasons behind it, the decision did little to change the status 
quo at home.93  Orders to integrate schools in the South were 
largely disregarded, and some districts openly resisted.94 The 
defiance of Arkansas governor Orval Faubus in using armed 
force to prevent nine black students from attending Central 
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas was quelled only by 
President Eisenhower’s deployment of the 101st Airborne 
 
 88. Bell, supra note 84, at 524. 
 89. Id.  Professor Mary Dudziak discovered documents that supported Bell’s 
argument that Brown was aimed at containing communism abroad.  See Mary 
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 62–63, 
80–93 (1988) (“[T]he international focus on U.S. racial problems meant that the 
image of American democracy was tarnished.  The apparent contradictions 
between American political ideology and practice led to particular foreign policy 
difficulties with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. U.S. government 
officials realized that their ability to sell democracy to the Third World was 
seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”).  The Pittsburgh 
Courier said of Brown, “This clarion announcement will also stun and silence 
America’s traducers behind the Iron Curtain.”  PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 
71. 
 90. Bell, supra note 84, at 524–25. 
 91. Id.  “America cannot maintain its leadership in the struggle for world 
democracy as long as the conditions exist which caused our arrest and 
conviction. We don’t fool anybody. People abroad know and are losing faith.” 
ARSENAULT, supra note 57, at 54 (quoting CORE founder Bayard Rustin 
following his arrest and subsequent incarceration arising out of the Journey to 
Reconciliation Freedom Ride). 
 92. See Bell, supra note 84, at 523–24. 
 93. See PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 221; Bell, supra note 84, at 528–29. 
 94. See Bell, supra note 84, at 528–29; Lopez, supra note 44, at 810. 
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Division.95  The enrollment of the first black man at the 
University of Mississippi erupted into such rioting and 
violence that President Kennedy had to send 16,000 federal 
troops to intervene. 96   And President Kennedy had to 
nationalize the Alabama National Guard when Governor 
George Wallace tried to block the entry of two black students 
to the University of Alabama to make good on his 
“segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever” 
campaign promise.97  Equality may have been the ideal, but it 
was certainly not the practice, neither in schools nor the rest 
of society.  Colorblindness had been rejected by the majority 
of the Court in Plessy.  It was rejected by a society that 
replaced slavery with Black Codes and then with Jim Crow.98  
It was rejected by a society that fought the desegregation of 
its schools and met marches for racial equality with violent 
resistance.  Color was just too important. 
But then a curious thing happened.  After decades of 
struggle, civil rights lawyers “dropped their demands for 
colorblindness and began to stress the necessity of race-
conscious remedies to achieve integration and substantive 
equality.”99  They sought measures like affirmative action, 
race-based preferences to remedy the effects of blacks having 
been previously systemically and categorically denied 
equality in a racially segregated society.100  And, consistent 
with Bell’s theory, as racial change threatened the 
 
 95. Juan Williams, Daisy Bates and the Little Rock Nine, NPR (Sept. 21, 
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14563865; Bell, 
supra note 84, at 528–29. 
 96. NADINE COHODAS, THE BAND PLAYED DIXIE 86 (1997). 
 97. PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 94. 
 98. The Black Codes replaced slavery with laws, “which imposed upon the 
colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the 
pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of 
little value.”  Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 70 (1872).  Based on the 
Black Codes, post-Reconstruction “Jim Crow” racial segregation laws 
institutionalized the inferiority of the black race.  Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 393 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (describing segregation under Jim Crow laws). 
 99. Lopez, supra note 44, at 810. 
 100. Id. at 811.  President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibited discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or 
national origin.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.  Noting, however, that civil rights 
laws alone could not remedy past discrimination, President Johnson issued an 
executive order that required government contractors to “take affirmative 
action” in placing minority employees in all aspects of hiring and employment.  
Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 FR 12319 (1965). 
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established structure of power and privilege, those who had 
previously opposed colorblindness now had an interest in its 
use.101  Whites accused those seeking affirmative action in 
favor of blacks as “impermissibly using ‘race’ to create a 
competitive advantage in the American distributive 
system.”102  In the vernacular, whites believed race was being 
impermissibly used to the advantage of blacks and to the 
disadvantage of whites.  Hiding “behind a color-blind façade,” 
colorblindness was once again co-opted and repurposed to 
attack affirmative action.103 
One of the first assaults came in the form of a challenge 
from a 38-year-old white male to a medical school admissions 
program in Regents of University of California v. Bakke.104  In 
a fractured decision that produced six opinions, none with a 
majority, the Supreme Court struck down a quota program 
that filled 16 of 100 open slots with “disadvantaged” 
minorities as an impermissible system of classification based 
on race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.105  Even 
though Justice Powell conceded that the black population “to 
some extent struggles still” (this, on the heels of a volatile 
civil rights movement just a decade before), he reduced over 
350 years of bondage, servitude, and brutal inequality to 
“transitory considerations,” comparable to the recent 
experiences of some Italian, Greek, and Slavic immigrant 
groups.106  Justice Powell recognized that the framers of the 
 
 101. Lopez, supra note 44, at 810.  While the Civil Rights Act “presumed to 
promote a color-blind society,” affirmative action efforts went far beyond that. 
PATTERSON, supra note 21, at 127, 136–37, 194. 
 102. Russell, supra note 56, at 1410. 
 103. Lopez, supra note 44, at 810; Nunn, supra note 25, at 436. 
 104. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 105. Id. at 275, 320. 
 106. Id. at 292 n.32, 298.  “The reply of many whites, especially of white 
ethnics who had only recently made it out of their own ghettoes, was: our 
groups too faced prejudice and discrimination; we haven’t made it to the top of 
American society, either, as is shown by our sparse representation at elite 
levels; and it is not fair to change the rules in midstream, after we have 
committed ourselves to them.”  Russell, supra note 56, at 1410 (quoting 
RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA 
317 (1990)).  To counter the prejudice they had encountered, first- and second-
generation immigrants “reaffirmed their own ‘whiteness’ ” by persecuting 
blacks, who ranked lower on the racial hierarchy. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY 
A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS 29 (1993).  But see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400–01 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not 
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Fourteenth Amendment had sought to bridge the gap of 
inequality between the “Negro race and the white 
‘majority.’ ” 107   However, he refused to employ a similar 
contemporary approach on the basis that the Amendment, 
when reduced to writing, used “universal terms, without 
reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior 
servitude.”108  He concluded that, “[t]he guarantee of equal 
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one 
individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, 
then it is not equal.” 109   After all, justice was to be 
colorblind.110  
C. Color-Blind Racism in Post-Racial America 
Many believe that the United States has entered a post-
racial era, where colorblindness has been attained and race 
no longer matters. 111   Best understood as a “rhetorical 
 
just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the 
history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as 
inferior by the law.  And that mark has endured.  The dream of 
America as the great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; 
because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot. 
Id. 
 107. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 293 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 
Wall. 36, 71 (1872)).  Justice Powell downplayed the significance of the white 
“majority” as a group “composed of various minority groups, most of which can 
lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and 
private individuals.”  Id. at 295. 
 108. Id. at 293. 
 109. Id. at 289–90.  Justice Marshall lamented that the Court’s approach 
would “ensure that America will forever remain a divided society.”  Id. at 396, 
401 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Nevertheless, 
Justice Powell opined that diversity in higher education was a “compelling 
interest,” and suggested that a more narrowly tailored program that used race 
“plus” as a factor in admissions, as opposed to a quota, would not violate the 
Constitution.  Id. at 311, 316–18, 321–24. 
 110. In the wake of Bakke, a woman challenged the University of Michigan 
Law School’s admissions program, which used race as a “predominant” factor, 
claiming it gave minority applicants ‘a significantly greater chance of admission 
than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups.’ ”  Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003). Writing for the majority, Justice 
O’Connor found diversity to be a compelling interest that could justify the 
narrowly tailored use of race in the selections process for public universities.  
Id. at 322, 343.  Envisioning a truly color-blind nation, but mindful that the 
Fourteenth Amendment sought to eliminate all racial classifications, Justice 
O’Connor set an aspirational time limit of twenty-five years for discontinuing 
the use of racial preferences.  Id. at 341–43. 
 111. Wiecek, supra note 55, at 3. 
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response to colorblindness,” post-racialists respond to charges 
of racism with a denial that race is an issue.112  In other 
words, if colorblindness was once aspirational, then post-
racialism is the attainment of that goal.113  Many claimed 
that the election of Barack Obama was “proof positive that 
the United States had entered a ‘post-racial’ era.”114  In a 
country with such a tortured racial history, the election of a 
black man to the American presidency was indeed 
monumental.115  As The Economist exclaimed, “America has 
turned the page on race.”116  To be sure, traditional racism as 
seen in days of Bull Connor has largely subsided and taken 
many of the overtly bad actors and actions with it.117 
Post-racialism draws on the bad-actor construct of 
restrictive racism and attributes acts of racism to the 
individual bigotry and animus of a few bad actors.118  Thus, 
the acceptable litmus test for racism in post-racial America 
has become whether someone commits an overtly racist act or 
utters a racial epithet as evidence of whether racism actually 
 
 112. Lopez, supra note 44, at 822.  “Post-racialism does not challenge this 
indifference, this sense that we are not responsible or capable of remedying 
racial injustice. It rather reassures us there is no injustice there to be 
remedied.”  Id. at 831. 
 113. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 114. Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, supra note 24, at 191; see also Domenico 
Montanaro, NBC News/WSJ Poll: Affirmative Action Support at Historic Low, 
NBCNEWS.COM (June 11, 2013), 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/11/18885926-nbc-newswsj-poll-
affirmative-action-support-at-historic-low; Lopez, supra note 44, at 807. 
 115. See Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election; McCain Loses as Bush 
Legacy Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05campaign.html?pagewanted=a
al.  “Barack Hussein Obama was elected the 44th president of the United States 
on Tuesday, sweeping away the last racial barrier in American politics with 
ease as the country chose him as its first black chief executive.”  Id. 
 116. Trouble with the Humans: Working-Class Whites Are Angry with the 
Democrats for Lots of Reasons. Race Is Not One of Them, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 
21, 2010), http://www.economist.com/ node/17308059.  “The electorate may be 
divided by race, but no longer mainly because of race.”  Id. 
 117. But see Candace J. Semien, Southern Alumnus Investigates Modern-Day 
Lynchings, WAFB.COM (Feb. 16, 2012 3:13 p.m.), 
http://ebrnorth.wafb.com/news/families/52190-southern-alumnus-investigates-
modern-day-lynchings; Dexter Rogers, Death in Mississippi: Lynching or 
Suicide, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2011 8:11 a.m.), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dexter-rogers/frederick-jermaine-
carter_b_827970.html. 
 118. Lopez, supra note 44, at 829; see also Schwabauer, supra note 68, at 654 
(describing traditional or restrictive racism as “intentional acts (or omissions) 
committed by individuals who were motivated by their racial animus.”). 
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exists or not.119  The “absence of these examples in their lives 
says to them racism has vanished or is a great deal less 
prevalent than in the past.”120  Acts of racism that cannot be 
ignored are explained away as “isolated occurrence[s] that 
result from a few malevolent individuals,” not as the 
prevailing attitude of society.121 
Believing that traditional racism no longer exists, or was 
largely overcome with President Obama’s election, post-
racialists reject structural racism and refuse to recognize its 
structural residue.122  But as Harvard law professor Randall 
 
 119. David Mura, Explaining Racism to My Daughter, in TAHAR BEN 
JELLOUN, RACISM EXPLAINED TO MY DAUGHTER 103 (1999). 
 120. Id. at 105–06. 
 121. Nunn, supra note 25, at 438.  Recent legal jurisprudence feeds this 
theory, as many laws have “arguably created or reflect an egalitarian norm” by 
prohibiting discrimination based on characteristics of race.  Maldonado, supra 
note 9, at 1469; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.  The Supreme Court has 
generally characterized racism only in the traditional or restrictive-racism 
theory, requiring a deliberate act by one who consciously sets out to harm 
another with racial animus.  Wiecek, supra note 55, at 4, 7.  The Court has not 
looked favorably on issues grounded in structural racism, such as affirmative 
action plans, leading some to say that the “most effective agent perpetuating 
[structural racism] has been the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize it.”  Id. at 
4, 6–7. 
 122. Structural inequities show the color line still divides modern American 
society along racial lines.  Housing patterns remain segregated, MASSEY & 
DENTON, supra note 106, at 60–82, and the 2010 census recorded an increasing 
wealth divide between white and black households, with the median white 
household income at $110,729, twenty-two times greater than the $4,955 of 
black households.  Tami Luhby, Worsening Wealth Inequality By Race, CNN 
MONEY (June 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/21/news/economy/wealth 
-gap-race/.  Even though blacks make up about twelve percent of the population, 
they accounted for a mere nine percent of the nation’s job gains.  Id.  
Unemployment for blacks is twice that of whites, and historically has been since 
the government began tracking unemployment figures in 1972.  Annalyn 
Censky, Unemployment Falls . . . But Not For Blacks, CNN MONEY (Jan. 6, 
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/06/news/economy/black_unemployment_ra 
te/index.htm?iid=EL.  At the beginning of 2012, the unemployment rate for 
blacks stood at 15.8 percent for blacks and 7.5 percent for whites.  Id.  
Disparities in educational opportunities have increased with black males 
making up only 2.8 percent of the undergraduate population even as white 
overrepresentation has risen at the top 468 schools.  ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & 
JEFF STROHL, GEORGETOWN U., GEORGETOWN PUB. POLICY INST., SEPARATE & 
UNEQUAL: HOW HIGHER EDUCATION REINFORCES THE INTERGENERATIONAL 
REPRODUCTION OF WHITE RACIAL PRIVILEGE 7–9, 19, (2013), available at  
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/Separate&Unequal.FR.pdf; 
SHAUN R. HARPER, THE JOINT CTR. HEALTH POL’Y INST. BLACK MALE 
STUDENTS AT PUBLIC FLAGSHIP UNIVERSITIES IN THE U.S.: STATUS, TRENDS, 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE, 8, 20 (2005), available at  
http://www.jointcenter.org/hpi/files/manual/Black%20Male%20Students%20at%
20Public%20Flagship.pdf.  As one scholar aptly recognized, “[r]ace remains a 
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Kennedy reminds, to declare that racism no longer exists is to 
deny the “breadth, depth, and subtlety of racial divisions in 
American life [and to forget that] something as thoroughly 
ingrained as American racial prejudice, particularly its 
antiblack variant, would not suddenly dissipate despite the 
goodwill effectively summoned by Obama’s skillful 
campaign.” 123   Thus, scholars argue that those who still 
consider the United States to be a color-blind society are 
actually taking a “very blind-sighted approach to race and 
color issues that prevents acknowledgment of unresolved 
issues of race and color inextricably intertwined with issues of 
power, status, and the allocation of resources.”124 
The problem with color-blind theory, however, when 
advanced by the former majority, is that it fails to see the flip 
side of the coin: “white privilege.”125  Based on the Latin word 
privilegium, meaning “a law affecting an individual,” white 
privilege has been defined as “an invisible package of 
unearned assets” belonging to whites because of a history of 
systemic racism.126  As some suggest, perhaps the greatest 
privilege of being white is that whites are not daily 
confronted with their race.127  Yet, when the issue is ignored, 
it reinforces what sociologists have termed “white 
 
stunningly powerful predictor of super- and subordination, ensuring that race 
has not nearly played itself out in America’s long struggle for a more perfect 
union.”  Lopez, supra note 44, at 808. 
 123. RANDALL KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL 
POLITICS AND THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 9 (2011).  “‘ You know,’ the President 
recently remarked, ‘on the heels of [my electoral] victory over a year ago, there 
were some who suggested that somehow we had entered into a post-racial 
America, all those problems would be solved.’  Then he deadpanned: ‘That didn’t 
work out so well.’ ”  Lopez, supra note 44, at 807. 
 124. Howe, supra note 1, at 89.  Recently, after issuing a disclaimer that her 
statements were not racist, former Alaskan Governor and Vice Presidential 
hopeful Sarah Palin flippantly compared the national debt to slavery.  When 
confronted with her use of hyperbole, which treated a system of bondage and 
torture as synonymous with a monetary obligation, Palin declared that people 
would be offended by her word usage only if they “misinterpreted” what she 
said. Jonathan Capehart, Sarah Palin Invokes Slavery, Inappropriately of 
Course, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blog 
s/post-partisan/wp/2013/11/15/sarah-palin-invokes-slavery-inappropriately-of-
course/. 
 125. Stephanie M. Wildman, The Persistence of White Privilege, 18 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 245, 246–47 (2005). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 245 (citing Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White 
Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 953, 969 (1993)). 
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normativity.”128  Whites begin to think that their privileged 
status is the norm, and that they are entitled to any benefits 
accruing to them under that system.129 
Indeed, under current post-racial thought, because color 
lines no longer exist, differences in race are not to be 
acknowledged.130  And those who dare to even bring up the 
issue of race are often vilified as racists themselves, or 
accused of “race baiting” or further marginalizing those who 
have made so much advancement.131  Termed “color-blind 
racism,” this “new form of societal racism” is just another 
example of how colorblindness has once again been seized to 
“defend and justify the contemporary racial order.”132  Unlike 
“the rallying cry of liberals during the years when Martin 
Luther King, Jr., dreamed of the day when all people would 
‘be judged not by the color of their skin but by the content of 
their character,’ . . . [t]hose advocating colorblindness today 
are often not the proponents of racial equality.”133  Instead, 
colorblindness has been co-opted as “a doctrine of 
conservatives” who believe that mentioning race is a matter 
of “playing the race card” in an effort to unfairly disadvantage 
whites.134  And despite current color-blind rhetoric, whites 
 
 128. Wiecek, supra note 55, at 11. 
 129. Id. at 12. 
 130. See KENNEDY, supra note 123, at 248.  But see Mura, supra note 119, at 
100 (contrasting his daughter’s wish “to live in a world where the terms ‘racism’ 
and ‘race’ no longer exist” with the desire for her to understand that it is 
sometimes “necessary and a good thing to group people by race in order to 
redress a social injustice.”). 
 131. See Darron T. Smith, Kieran Romney and the Paradox of Transracial 
Adoption, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dar 
ron-t-smith-phd/kieran-romney_b_4531158.html (“[M]ost whites are paralyzed 
by the thought of being labeled ‘racist’ to the point that some clumsily and 
disingenuously invoke statements like ‘some of my best friends are Black’ to 
appear as though they are not racist.  What the pundits seemed most upset 
about is that the obvious was spoken and the elephant in the room was 
addressed, rather than maintaining the façade of colorblindness.”); Mirkinson, 
supra note 25. 
 132. Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich, supra note 24, at 190–91; Lopez, supra note 44, 
at 828. One author analogized the continued black struggle as “the competition 
between blacks and whites to a race.  The white person sees the black person 
line up at the starting line and says, okay, let’s have a fair race. If I win I’m the 
better qualified.  But what the white person doesn’t realize . . . is that the black 
person has run several miles already to get to the starting line.  It’s not a fair 
race at all.”  Mura, supra note 119, at 121. 
 133. Twila Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of 
Discourse and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33, 78 (1993–
94). 
 134. PAMELA ANNE QUIROZ, ADOPTION IN A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 1 (2007).  
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still continue to dictate social policy—including adoption 
policy—most often to their own advantage.135 
II. THE CO-OPTION OF ADOPTION TO SATISFY WHITE 
INTERESTS 
A. Co-opting Domestic Adoption 
The dominant thought towards United States domestic 
adoptions in the mid- to late-twentieth century was that of 
the “as-if-genealogical” family.136  “As if” adoptions described 
the ideal that adopted children should be incorporated into 
families “as if” they were born into that family, meaning the 
children should look like the adoptive parents and share their 
genealogical makeup.137  Thus, children were “matched” to 
parents who favorably compared in social, racial, and physical 
aspects.138  Adoption, then, tended to reflect the status quo, as 
the courts, churches, adoption professionals, and the general 
population maintained legal, religious, political, and social 
justifications for keeping children with families of their same 
race.139  That meant the adoption industry, like the rest of 
American society, remained largely segregated for years.140 
 
Indeed, many “believe that affirmative action undermines standards of merit in 
order to redistribute social goods proportionately for minority groups,”  Perry, 
supra note 133, at 78, and why the United States Supreme Court was primed to 
take a color-blind approach to deny the most recent challenge to affirmative 
action.  See Richard Wolf, Justices Voice Support for State Affirmative Action 
Ban, USA TODAY (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/15/supreme-court-
affirmative-action-race-michigan/2969443/ (discussing Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct. 1633 (2013)).  The Supreme Court has 
generally characterized racism only in the traditional or restrictive-racism 
theory, requiring a deliberate act by one who consciously sets out to harm 
another with racial animus.  Wiecek, supra note 55, at 4, 7.  The Court has not 
looked favorably on issues grounded in structural racism, such as affirmative 
action plans, leading some to say that the “most effective agent perpetuating 
[structural racism] has been the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize it.”  Id. at 
4, 6–7. 
 135. QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 3, 14. 
 136. JUDITH S. MODELL, KINSHIP WITH STRANGERS: ADOPTION AND 
INTERPRETATIONS OF KINSHIP IN AMERICAN CULTURE 2 (1994). 
 137. Id. at 20 (“The thrust of adoption law and policy is to pretend that blood 
is there; a fictive kinship is just like a biological relationship.”). 
 138. Julie Berebitsky, Family Ideals and the Social Construction of Modern 
Adoption, in ADOPTIVE FAMILIES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 29, 36 (Katarina Wegar 
ed., 2006). 
 139. QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 36, 41. 
 140. Ellen Herman, The Adoption History Project: African-American 
Adoptions, U. OF OR., http://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/AfricanAmerica 
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By many accounts, most agencies denied blacks adoption 
services, and blacks were largely left out of the process.141  
Accordingly, those adopting tended to be white parents 
seeking white children that looked like them.  Black children 
available for adoption were considered to be “special needs,” 
or “hard-to-place;” most were never adopted.142  The black 
community simply took care of its own through relatives and 
kinship care rather than formal adoption processes.143  Even 
as services slowly began to include the adoption of black 
children, or “Negro” adoptions, the process remained 
segregated, with children being matched only with adoptive 
parents of the same race.144 
Significant changes in the latter part of the twentieth 
century, such as the availability of contraceptives and 
abortion, led to a shortage of healthy white infants placed for 
adoption.145  An industry that had operated on race-matching 
as in the best interests of the child suddenly found the supply 
of white children could not meet the demand.  In 1967, after 
the Supreme Court struck down the prohibition of interracial 
marriage in Loving v. Virginia,146 a small but definite trend 
emerged as white families began adopting black children.147  
However, the adoption of black children by whites garnered 
considerable negative attention and drew significant backlash 
from the black community, with some social workers calling 
such adoptions “the new slavery.” 148   The National 
 
n.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2012). 
 141. Id.; QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 37. 
 142. Herman, supra note 140; Glaser, supra note 18. 
 143. Herman, supra note 140.  The U.S. Children’s Bureau was created in 
1912 by President Taft as the first federal agency tasked with improving the 
lives of children and families. Children’s Bureau: CB Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/fact-sheet-cb.  It 
began including race in its reporting system in 1948.  Herman, supra note 140. 
 144. Herman, supra note 140. 
 145. Perry, supra note 133, at 41.  Other factors, such as delayed family 
planning with increased infertility, the legalization of abortion, and the 
declining stigma of single motherhood, contributed as well.  QUIROZ, supra note 
134, at 40. 
 146. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 147. Ellen Herman, The Adoption History Project: Transracial Adoptions, U. 
OF OR., http://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/transracialadoption.htm (last 
updated Feb. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Herman, Transracial]; BARTHOLET, FAMILY 
BONDS, supra note 4, at 94. 
 148. Glaser, supra note 18; Perry, supra note 133, at 55 (“To some blacks, 
[the placement of black children in white homes by a white-dominated social 
worker industry] may suggest that the disempowerment of enslaved Blacks has 
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Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) reacted and, in 
1972, publicly opposed the practice of transracial adoption, 
claiming that the adoption of black children by whites was a 
form of “cultural genocide” that returned blacks to “chattel 
status.”149  On the heels of a civil rights movement that was 
met by violence and white resistance to any form of black 
social advancement, the adoption of black children by whites 
was seen by many blacks as yet another attempt at 
disempowerment—and a further recasting of white 
domination and entitlement.150 
In the aftermath of the NABSW controversy, the 
adoption of black American children decreased by 39 
percent. 151   The decline was met with charges of racism 
against the black community and NABSW for laying claim to 
“their children,” instead of truly caring about the children’s 
best interests.152  Indeed, those who opposed such adoptions 
were “accused of wanting race-conscious policy that failed to 
benefit children.”153  Opposition to race-matching increased, 
and scholars advanced that adoptions would never be 
colorblind until agencies assigned children to adoptive 
parents without regard to their race. 154   Harvard law 
professor Elizabeth Bartholet advocated that placing black 
children only in black homes was “inconsistent with an 
appropriate understanding of the role race should play in 
social ordering,” and advanced that racism could be 
eliminated through transracial adoption. 155   Particularly 
concerned with the effect of color-conscious matching policies 
on black children languishing in foster care, Bartholet 
suggested that color-blind policies would allow more children 
 
continued in modern-day America.”). 
 149. Herman, Transracial, supra note 147; BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, 
supra note 4, at 90; Perry, supra note 133, at 42. 
 150. See Perry, supra note 133, at 55; QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 3. 
 151. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1455 & n.196.  The Child Welfare League of 
America rewrote its adoption standards the next year to conform to the NABSW 
stance, resulting in a substantial chilling of the adoption of black American 
children. Herman, Transracial, supra note 147. 
 152. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics 
of Race Matching in Transracial Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1232–33 
(1991) [hereinafter Bartholet, Black Children]. 
 153. QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 41. 
 154. Id. at 3; Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1470 (citing Perry, supra note 133, 
at 104). 
 155. Bartholet, Black Children, supra note 152, at 1172. 
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to escape foster care through adoption. 156   Further, she 
advanced that the best interests of the child, i.e., finding a 
home, should be exercised without interference by the state157 
or even by the child’s community of origin.158 
Congress responded to the NABSW controversy by 
enacting the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA).159  Signed 
into law by President Clinton in 1994 as part of the 
Improving America’s Schools Act, MEPA expressly prohibited 
agencies that received federal assistance from denying foster 
care or adoptive placements “solely on the basis of race.”160  
Two years later, Congress amended MEPA to delete the word 
“solely” from the language of the Act, clarifying that race 
could not be a factor in placements, solely or otherwise.161  In 
other words, placements were to be colorblind—agencies that 
received federal funding could no longer use race to determine 
placements.162  This meant that prospective adoptive parents, 
most of whom were white and formerly denied children under 
race-matching policies, could no longer be denied the children 
they wanted due to the child’s race. 163   Although these 
transracial adoptions never amounted to a significant 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (refusing to consider race 
in its review of a Florida child custody determination which involved a 
subsequent mixed marriage). 
 158. Id. at 1242, 1245–46, 1255; Perry, supra note 133, at 82–83.  As color-
blind discourse moved into the adoption arena, scholar Twila Perry termed 
Bartholet’s position “color-blind individualism.”  Perry, supra note 133, at 43–
45; see also QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 18 (citing RANDALL KENNEDY, 
INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION (2003)); 
Bartholet, Black Children, supra note 152, at 1201–06, 1232–33; Joan Mahoney, 
The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and Cultural Preservation, 59 
UMKC L. REV. 487, 487–501 (1991). 
 159. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553, 
108 Stat. 3518 (1994) (repealed in 1996). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Small Business Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 
Stat. 1755 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1)(A) (2006)) (reenacting the pertinent 
portions of the MEPA under the Interethnic Adoption Provisions).  Congress 
followed this legislation with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. 
L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 162. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1457.  Private agencies were not so 
constrained and encouraged adoptive parents to select preferences in race.  Id. 
at 1470 n.276 (quoting Bartholet, Black Children, supra note 152, at 1186–87) 
(“[A]n initial order of business for most adoption agencies is the separation of 
children and prospective parents into racial classifications.”). 
 163. Emily Upshur & Jack Demick, Adoption and Identity in Social Context, 
in ADOPTIVE FAMILIES IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 99 (Katarina Wegar ed., 2006). 
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number,164 what was previously taboo was now recast “as an 
altruistic effort toward social betterment” and a positive step 
toward the creation of a nonracist society.165  Colorblindness, 
through “best interests,” had been co-opted to satisfy white 
demand. 
B. International Adoption and the Hague Convention’s 
Subsidiarity Requirement 
International adoption in the United States originated 
from a humanitarian desire to aid children orphaned by 
war.166  It was not a common practice and the number of 
children adopted from outside of the United States remained 
relatively small. 167   Following the NABSW controversy, 
however, Americans increasingly looked to foreign markets 
for children. 168   By 1993, international adoption rates 
outpaced all other adoptions of unrelated children. 169  As 
American demand for infants grew, and American supply 
dwindled, the United States brought in nearly a quarter of a 
million children from other nations and became known as the 
largest “receiving country” for international adoptions.170 
Although the globalization of adoption has provided more 
adoption opportunities, it has also opened avenues for 
potential abuses.171  Evidence of corruption, including child 
abduction, surfaced in Guatemala.172  Similar problems arose 
in Vietnam, India, Cambodia, and other countries, where 
children were bought and sold for adoption.173  Many who 
 
 164. Herman, Transracial, supra note 147 (estimating that only 2,500 
adoptions were finalized even at their peak in 1970, and that no more than 
12,000 black children were placed in white homes before 1975). 
 165. See QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 40; Perry, supra note 133, at 36, 45. 
 166. HOWELL, supra note 1, at 144, 171. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1455 & n.196. 
 169. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, FUTURE CHILD: ADOPTION, 
Spring 1993, at 45. 
 170. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1455 & n.196; Intercountry Adoption: 
Statistics, supra note 6. 
 171. Perry, supra note 133, at 178; Joanne Csete et al., Rights as Recourse: 
Globalized Motherhood and Human Rights, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
MOTHERHOOD: DECONSTRUCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY AND 
CARE (Wendy Chavkin & JaneMaree Maher eds., 2010) (citing Brysk, supra 
note 17, at 1). 
 172. Roby et al., supra note 2, at 2.  The United States issued a moratorium 
on adoptions from Guatemala in 2008, which is still in effect.  Id. 
 173. See DeLeith Duke Gossett, If Charity Begins at Home, Why Do We Go 
Searching Abroad? Why The Federal Adoption Tax Credit Should Not Subsidize 
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adopted from Ethiopia later discovered that their children 
were relinquished because of promises made to biological 
parents that the children would go to America for a good 
education and return home afterwards; the children were 
neither orphans nor abandoned, but were relinquished based 
on misunderstandings of the permanency of Western 
adoption. 174   This narrative proved to be recursive. 175  As 
international adoption increasingly devolved into what 
amounted to little more than child trafficking, countries 
sought to curb abusive practices through international 
regulation.176 
Passed with the express purpose of curbing child 
trafficking and other abuses arising from the global adoption 
 
International Adoptions, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 839, 869–73 (2013). 
 174. See, e.g., Tarikuwa Lemma, International Adoption: I Was Stolen From 
my Family, CNN (Sept. 16, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/16/opinion/in 
ternational-adoption-tarikuwa-lemma-stolen-children/index.html (detailing the 
story of a girl whose father was told she and her sisters were being sent to the 
United States on a study program); John Nicol, Ethiopian Adoption: Canadian 
Parents Raise Concerns, CBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2009), www.cbc.ca/canada/st 
ory/2009/03/19/f-ethiopia-adoption.html. 
 175. See, e.g., David Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry 
Adoption System Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, 
Trafficking, Kidnapping, and Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113 (2006); 
David Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The Significance of the 
Indian Adoption Scandals, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 403 (2005); Jini L. Roby & 
Stephanie Matsumura, If I Give You My Child, Aren’t We Family? A Study of 
Birthmothers Participating in Marshall Island–U.S. Adoptions, 5 ADOPTION 
QUARTERLY, no. 4, 2002, at  7; HOWELL, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
 176. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20, 
1989), reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1464 art. 21(b) (1989).  The first attempt, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), included language that 
prioritized for care of children “in any suitable manner” in the country of origin 
over intercountry adoption.  Id.  Even though the CRC included the “best 
interests of the child” tenet, the United States interpreted the “any suitable” 
language within the CRC to mean that foster care and institutionalization were 
preferred over international adoption. Elizabeth Bartholet, International 
Adoption: The Human Rights Issues, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW 
POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 95 (2010) [hereinafter Bartholet, Human 
Rights]; Barbara Yngvesson, Transnational Adoption and the 
Transnationalization of Motherhood: Rethinking Abandonment, Adoption and 
Return, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD: DECONSTRUCTIONS AND 
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY AND CARE 109 (Wendy Chavkin & JaneMaree 
Maher eds., 2010).  Charging that the CRC reflected a bias against intercountry 
adoption, the United States refused to ratify the treaty.  Somalia ratified the 
Convention earlier this year, leaving the United States as the only nation that 
has not ratified the CRC.  Press Release, UNICEF, Government of Somalia 
Ratifies UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_78732.html; Csete et al., supra note 171, at 
214. 
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industry, the Hague Convention standardized the 
international adoption process between member countries 
and provided regulatory safeguards for member countries 
engaged in international adoption. 177   It incorporated the 
“best interests of the child” principle and, as part of its 
protocols, required member countries to establish a central 
authority, which decides whether a child is legally 
adoptable.178  The Hague Convention also includes a proviso, 
known as the “subsidiarity principle,” which subordinates 
international adoption to domestic adoption.179  It notes that 
international adoption “may offer the advantage of a 
permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family 
cannot be found in his or her State of origin.”180  But it is 
allowed only as a last resort, after local authorities give “due 
consideration” that all possibilities for placement of the child 
within the state of origin have been considered. 181  That 
means that international adoption might still be considered to 
be in the best interests of the child, but only if all avenues to 
domestic adoptions have been exhausted and found 
wanting.182 
The United States signed the Hague Convention in 1993 
and began the long process toward ratification.183  The State 
 
 177. Hague Convention, supra note 3; Yngvesson, supra note 176.  The 
Hague Convention was seen as “an important development” over the CRC, as it 
was not interpreted to require foster care or institutionalization over 
international adoption.  Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 176, at 95; Csete 
et al., supra note 171, at 214. 
 178. Hague Convention, supra note 3, at 1134–46.  The central authority is 
charged with establishing protocols ensuring the voluntary relinquishment of 
the child by the mother. Yngvesson, supra note 176.  Any money exchanged is 
only to be for the “cost and expenses, including reasonable professional fees of 
persons involved in the adoption.”  Hague Convention, supra note 3, at arts. 6–
9, 32.  For “foundlings,” or abandonments, the central authority must establish 
that no kin are available or willing to claim the child.  Id. 
 179. Hague Convention, supra note 3, at 1139–40 art. 4(b). 
 180. Id. at 1139. 
 181. Id.  “This principle recognizes that when the birth family experiences a 
crisis, the respective systems—such as the extended family network, community 
resources, and domestic permanency options—are the natural lines of protection 
for the child.  ICA is an option for a child whose birth family cannot provide care 
and after consideration has been given to families in the country of origin.”  
Roby et al., supra note 2, at 6. 
 182. Hague Convention, supra note 3; Csete et al., supra note 171, at 214. 
 183. Some claim the United States did not come into compliance with the 
Hague Convention sooner, because of its extensive adoption activity with 
Guatemala, a country marked by corruption and where, it was said, “every 
100th baby born in Guatemala grows up as an adopted American.”  Peter 
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Department publicly declared adherence to the Hague 
Convention to be the official position of the United States 
government and encouraged “all countries to take the 
necessary steps to join and implement The Hague Inter-
Country Adoption Convention.”184 Indeed, by the time the 
Hague Convention was ratified by the United States in 2008, 
many anticipated a gradual shift from international adoption 
towards domestic adoption programs, in line with the Hague 
Convention’s subsidiarity principle. 185   Soon after the 
regulations were promulgated and the treaty was finally 
implemented,186 the State Department publicly stressed the 
“paramount position of the subsidiarity principle in 
international adoptions,” stating: 
It’s a fundamental tenet of the convention that when a 
child cannot be reintegrated into his or her birth family, 
the first option should be adoption by a family in that 
child’s country of origin.  When that domestic adoption in 
the child’s country of origin is not possible, then inter-
country adoption opens another opportunity for a child to 
find the loving home that he or she deserves.187 
That is in line with U.S. obligations under international 
law. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention states that 
signatories to a treaty shall not defeat the purpose of a 
treaty. 188  In other words, once a country enters into an 
agreement, such as the Hague Convention, with another 
country, it must refrain from conduct that thwarts that 
 
Selman, The Movement of Children for International Adoption, in 
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: GLOBAL INEQUITIES AND THE CIRCULATION OF 
CHILDREN 47 (Laura Briggs & Diana Marre eds., 2009) (quoting Juan Carlos 
Llorca, Hague Treaty Likely to Slow Guatemala Adoptions, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(July 29, 2006)); see also Laura Briggs & Diana Marre, Introduction: The 
Circulation of Children, in INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: GLOBAL INEQUITIES AND 
THE CIRCULATION OF CHILDREN 14 (Laura Briggs & Diana Marre eds., 2009).  
When the United States finally ratified the Hague Convention and it went into 
effect in 2008, the State Department admonished against initiating adoptions 
from Guatemala.  Selman, supra note 6. 
 184. Press Release, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs 
Michele Bond, Briefing on National Adoption Day (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/nov/132215.html [hereinafter Press 
Release: Michele Bond]. 
 185. Yngvesson, supra note 176, at 109; Glaser, supra note 18. 
 186. See Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106–279, § 102(e), 114 
Stat. 828 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14912(e)). 
 187. Press Release: Michele Bond, supra note 184. 
 188. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
292 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
agreement.189  
Eighteen months after the United States implemented 
the Hague Convention, the State Department admitted that 
some adoptions were still non-Hague compliant because they 
began before the Hague Convention was finally 
implemented.190  However, the State Department suggested 
that prospective adoptions would be restricted to Hague 
countries, consistent with the subsidiarity principle’s 
requirement that adoption agencies make every effort to place 
children domestically before seeking their placement 
abroad.191  Indeed, the number of international adoptions into 
the United States decreased as countries began to develop 
programs that emphasized domestic adoption.192 
Recently, Ambassador Susan Jacobs issued a press 
release that noted that “every child deserves to grow up in a 
loving family environment,” but that is sometimes impossible 
in the child’s home country.193  In those cases, the United 
States supports “ethical, transparent intercountry adoptions 
as part of a fully developed child welfare system.”194  She 
stressed that, “[t]he Department of State works with eighty-
nine partner countries under the 1993 Hague Convention to 
ensure that procedures are in place to protect the interests of 
children and families throughout the adoption process. The 
Hague Convention is a legal framework that ensures 
intercountry adoptions are transparent and ethical.”195  The 
implication was clear: the United States is a partner to the 
Hague Convention and works with other member countries to 
make sure international adoptions—when necessary—are 
 
 189. See id. Further, each party bound by the treaty must act in good faith. 
Id. at art. 26. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Miriam Jordan, Foreign Adoptions by Americans Down to Lowest Level 
Since 1982, THE WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2015), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/foreign-adoptions-by-americans-drop-to-lowest-
level-since-1982-1427837631.  The amount of children adopted internationally 
by U.S. citizens decreased from 17,456 children in 2008, when the Hague was 
implemented, to 6,441 in 2014.  Id.; Intercountry Adoption: Statistics, supra 
note 6. 
 193. Human Rights: U.S. Supports Intercountry Adoptions, VOICE OF 
AMERICA (Nov. 25, 2013), http://editorials.voa.gov/content/us-supports-
intercountry-adoption/1797812.html. 
 194. Promoting Ethical, Transparent Adoptions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/national_adoption_month.php (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2014). 
 195. Human Rights: U.S. Supports Intercountry Adoptions, supra note 193. 
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legal and ethical, and adherence to the Hague Convention 
facilitates those goals.  
C. Co-opting International Adoption 
Since the United States ratified the Hague Convention in 
2008, and in line with the subsidiarity principle, many 
countries have increased the number of domestically-placed 
children and reduced the number of children made available 
for international adoption.196  Despite its stated commitment 
to the Hague Convention, however, the United States 
routinely allows its own citizens to bypass Hague Convention 
requirements and protocols to adopt children from countries 
that are not Hague members.  State Department records 
show that thousands of children, most from non-Hague 
countries, are still being brought into the United States each 
year for adoption.197 Of the top sending countries in the last 
several years, four out of five were non-Hague members.198  
Indeed, current law creates “a strong incentive for American 
parents to adopt foreign children” by allowing generous tax 
credits without discriminating between adoptions from Hague 
and non-Hague countries.199  These factors have created a 
two-tiered international adoption system: the United States, 
having ratified the agreement, encourages other countries to 
follow the Hague Convention—even shutting down adoptions 
from non-compliant countries 200 —but allows American 
citizens to bypass the Hague Convention and its espoused 
protections and adopt from non-Hague compliant countries. 
1. Reframing Whose Interests? 
International adoption involves a recurring theme: 
adopters from wealthy nations descend upon poor, developing 
nations and deliver them of their children. 201   Whereas 
 
 196. Jordan, supra note 192; Intercountry Adoption: Statistics, supra note 6. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for Our Own: Why American Adoption Law 
and Policy Must Change, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327, 366 (1997).  The 
federal adoption tax credit, established to incentivize the adoption of children 
from foster care, is now being used to subsidize international adoptions at the 
expense of the intended beneficiaries.  See id.; Gossett, supra note 173, at 886–
88, 893–97. 
 200. Voigt, supra note 5. 
 201. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 142.  Even international 
adoption proponent Bartholet recognizes that international adoption “can be 
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international adoption used to “find families for children,” 
today the practice is about “finding children for families.”202  
What has resulted, contrary to Hague intentions, is a 
“revolving door” of incoming and outgoing children, where the 
Hague subsidiarity requirement is overlooked and children 
are traded between countries to satisfy parental preferences.  
The response by developing countries has been much the 
same as NABSW’s 1972 response to the adoptions of black 
children by whites.  Many sending countries charge that 
international adoption is another form of imperialism and 
cultural genocide.203  They argue that wealthy nations, which 
have already exploited labor and raw materials, now allow 
their white parents to steal their countries’ last, most 
precious resource—their children.204  And just as the black 
community and NABSW were vilified as being racist for 
laying claim to “their children,” developing nations that seek 
family unification efforts above international adoption by 
westerners are now portrayed as not caring about the “best 
interests” of their own children.205 
 
understood as the ultimate form of exploitation . . . the taking by the rich and 
powerful of the children born to the poor and powerless.  In international 
adoption, the privileged classes in the industrialized nations adopt the children 
of the least privileged groups in the poorest nations.”  Id. 
 202. Kirsten Lovelock, Intercountry Adoption as a Migratory Practice: A 
Comparative Analysis of Intercountry Adoption and Immigration Policy and 
Practice in the United States, Canada and New Zealand in the Post W.W. II 
Period, 34 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 907, 908 (2000) (characterizing international 
adoptions after WWII and Korean War as “finding families for children” as 
opposed to international adoptions today which “find[] children for families.”); 
JOYCE MAGUIRE PAVAO, THE FAMILY OF ADOPTION 123 (1998) (coining the 
phrase that adoption should not be “about finding children for families, but 
about finding families for children.”). 
 203. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1464–65 & n.248 (quoting HOWARD 
ALSTEIN & RITA SIMON, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A MULTINATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 1 (1991) (“[W]hat the West has generally viewed as charitable, 
humane and even noble behavior, developing countries have come to define as 
imperialistic, self-serving and a return to a form of colonialism in which whites 
exploit and steal natural resources.”)); HOWELL, supra note 1, at 171; ADAM 
PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION 23 (2000). 
 204. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1464–65 & n.248 (quoting Jane Rowe, 
Perspectives on Adoption, in ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 6 
(Euthymia Hibbs ed., 1991) (noting the “natural response” from poor, struggling 
countries is “[f]irst you want our labor and raw materials; now you want our 
children.”)). 
 205. See Bartholet, Black Children, supra note 152, at 1232–33.  Akin to the 
cultural arguments made against black communities in the United States, 
Bartholet and others argue that these poor countries are more concerned with 
nationalism than the best interests of their children, who might have a better 
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To many, international adoption is an “amazing social 
program that changes people at no cost to the home 
country.” 206  Indeed, modern proponents advance that the 
globalization of adoption presumably solves “adopting 
nations’ ‘need’ for children and children’s ‘need’ for ‘complete’ 
families.”207  But the number of “orphans” (reportedly as high 
as 200 million)208 has been grossly exaggerated; the actual 
number is less than a tenth of the number promoted.209  The 
change in orphan nomenclature is due in part to efforts of 
NGOs like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 
and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS 
(UNAIDS), which label as “orphan,” for humanitarian aid 
purposes, those children who have lost a parent to death, 
separation, or abandonment. 210   “True orphans,” in the 
historical context, those who have lost both parents, are now 
referred to as “double orphans,” merely a subset of the larger 
“orphan” population.211  However, UNICEF explicitly warns 
against misinterpreting “this difference in terminology” to 
mean that these children are “in need of a new family, 
shelter, or care,” i.e., international adoption, and stresses that 
the focus should instead be on supporting their families and 
communities.212 
In reality, those working in developing countries stress 
that it is western demand that is actually increasing the 
number of “orphans.”  Westerners begin to adopt, and the 
predictable pattern of supply and demand begins to emerge; 
 
life with a family in a different country.  See id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Yngvesson, supra note 176, at 123. 
 208. See infra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 209. The actual number of orphans is between thirteen to eighteen million. 
Kevin Voigt & Sophie Brown, International Adoptions in Decline as Number of 
Orphans Grows, CNN.COM (Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-adoption-main-story-
decline/?c=&page=1; Press Release, UNICEF, UNICEF’s Position on Orphans 
(May 25, 2012), http://www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html [hereinafter 
Press Release: UNICEF]. 
 210. C.W. Gailey, Race, Class and Gender in Intercountry Adoption in the 
USA, in PETER SELMAN, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: DEVELOPMENT, TRENDS 
AND PERSPECTIVES (Selman ed., 2000)).  Adoption is a legal transaction that 
allows “permitted family relations to be created artificially.”  HOWELL, supra 
note 1, at 41–42, 142.  To satisfy the legal fiction that a child made available for 
international adoption is an actual “orphan,” most children are registered as 
abandoned.  Selman, supra note 6, at 85–86. 
 211. Press Release: UNICEF, supra note 209. 
 212. Id. 
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more orphanages are built, the orphanages seek more 
children, and the number of “orphans” increases to 
accommodate the demand.213  The United States government 
even acknowledges that when adoptions were closed in a 
number of countries, the orphanages emptied out, and the 
children went home.214  But the “convenient myth” that all 
adoptees from foreign nations are orphans allows those 
adopting to believe they are participants in a greater good 
even as they turn a blind eye to facts that do not support 
their purpose.215 
It used to be that international adoption played a limited 
role in the care of orphans.  Twenty years ago, Professor 
Bartholet advocated for international adoption as “an 
opportunity to solve some of these problems for some 
children.” 216   But she also recognized that international 
adoption “can of course play only a very limited role. Long-
term solutions lie in reallocating social and economic 
resources, both between countries and within countries, so 
that children can more generally be cared for by their birth 
families. But international adoption can play at least some 
role.”217  Even in the last few years, she commented that 
“[i]nternational adoption is not a panacea. . . . The best 
solution, in any event, would be to solve the problems of social 
and economic injustice that prevent so many birth parents 
 
 213. Roby et al., supra note 2, at 5.  Missionaries state, “If you want to 
increase the number of orphans in a community start an orphanage.”  Dave 
Jenkins, Missionary Reflections on Kathryn Joyce’s The Child Catchers: Rescue, 
Trafficking, and the New Gospel of Adoption, HEKIMA: GREAT LAKES 
MESSENGER BLOG (Aug. 14, 2013), http://hekimagreatlakesmessenger.blogspot.c 
om/2013/08/missionary-reflections-on-kathryn.html; Yngvesson, supra note 176, 
at 109.  UNICEF’s Doug Webb stated, “If you build an orphanage, it will be 
filled with kids.”  JOYCE, supra note 16, at 155.  See also D. Marianne Blair, 
Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry Adoption: Assessing the 
Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 363 (2005) (quoting the American 
ambassador to Cambodia who found that Western demand “‘resulted in new 
orphanages built expressly’ to accommodate American adoptions,” and were 
“filled with children who seem custom-ordered to suit American tastes.”). 
 214. See Links for the Week, INT’L ADOPTION READER BLOG (May 4, 2013), 
http://readerinternationaladoption.wordpress.com/2013/05/04/links-for-the-
week-5/  (recounting experiences in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Guatemala, where 
the number of institutionalized children decreased when international adoption 
was closed in those countries); Conversations with America: Intercountry 
Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/conversation_with_america.php. 
 215. HOWELL, supra note 1, at 57–58. 
 216. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 151. 
 217. Id. 
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from being able to raise their children themselves.”218 
The problem is that the current role it is playing—the 
same role that she envisioned—is no longer enough.  Long a 
proponent of intercountry adoption “at the most enthusiastic 
end of the spectrum of supporters,”219  Professor Bartholet 
now takes an extreme position towards international 
adoption and proposes concurrent planning as part of her 
model to do away with the subsidiarity principle: 
Ideally, in my view, there should be no in-country 
preference. Countries should simply place children as soon 
as possible in any available adoptive homes. But if 
countries institute such a preference, as, under the Hague 
Convention, they are required to, they should do so in a 
way designed to cause no delay whatsoever in placement 
for children. Concurrent planning is the term for the 
adoption program inside the United States that should 
serve as the model.220 
The term “concurrent planning” refers to the practice in 
foster care where “adoption professionals work 
simultaneously to reunite children in foster care with their 
birth parents, while they work to prepare for adoption.”221  It 
replaced the more traditional “sequential planning” where 
one permanency plan, such as reunification, is ruled out 
before an alternative plan is developed.222  This came about as 
the result of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 and 
its subsequent amendments, which require courts and child 
welfare agencies “to work on a much faster timetable by 
mandating that a hearing must be held no later than twelve 
months after a child enters foster care.” 223  Although not 
incorporated by every State, concurrent planning is an 
attempt to make sure that American children are placed 
earlier and do not languish in foster care.224  But importing 
 
 218. Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 176, at 97. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 107. 
 221. Id. 
 222. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD.’S BUREAU, CHILD 
WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY 1–2 (2012), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/concurrent.cfm. 
 223. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, supra note 161; Howe, supra 
note 1, at 89. 
 224. Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 176, at 107.  “At the point that a 
decision is reached not to reunite, the child can immediately move forward to 
adoption.”  Id.  More than half of the States do not require concurrent planning 
as part of their foster care permanency plan.  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
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this concept into the international adoption framework is in 
contravention of the Hague Convention’s subsidiarity 
principle, which follows sequential planning: “Adapted to 
international adoption, this model would mean that adoption 
officials in the sending country would plan simultaneously for 
the international adoption, while they checked to see if any 
domestic placement would be possible, rather than planning 
the international adoption only after exhausting the 
possibility of domestic adoption.”225 
The lack of regard for the Hague Convention protocols 
and protections has been increasingly overt.  In the aftermath 
of the 2010 Haiti earthquake that left more than a million 
people homeless, U.S. relief efforts focused almost exclusively 
on the children of the ravaged country.226  Even as waiting 
adults were turned away, the State Department suspended 
protocol and implemented its “humanitarian parole” policy to 
expedite the adoption of Haitian children by Americans.227  In 
the rush, more than 1,150 Haitian “orphaned” children were 
taken to the United States and it was not discovered until 
later that many were, in fact, not orphans, but had family 
who were searching for them in the chaos after the 
earthquake.228  When UNICEF, Save the Children, and World 
Vision called for a halt to the exodus of Haitian children so 
the government could determine which children were actually 
orphaned, international adoption advocates charged that 
these groups were not “working for the good of the children,” 
and that the Haitian children were being held hostage.229  
Professor Bartholet criticized UNICEF, claiming it has played 
a “major rule in recent attempts to restrict international 
adoption” because it takes the position that “permanent 
family” care in the country of origin is preferable to out-of-
country adoption. 230   Former Louisiana Senator Mary 
Landrieu231 echoed that statement by warning that “[e]ither 
 
supra note 222, at 2. 
 225. Id. 
 226. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 3. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 5, 10, 20. 
 229. Id. at 11. 
 230. Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 176, at 95–96. 
 231. Landrieu was a former champion of the Hague Convention.  On March 
23, 1999, she and Senator Helms and other co-sponsors introduced the 
Intercountry Adoption Convention Implementation Act of 1999, which 
implemented the Hague Convention.  S. 682, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999). 
2015] IGNORING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE 299 
UNICEF is going to change or have a very difficult time 
getting support from the U.S. Congress.”232 
However, UNICEF’s position is consistent with the 
subsidiarity principle of the Hague Convention, the very 
agreement that Landrieu championed in 2000 when she 
sponsored the Intercountry Adoption Act, which implemented 
the Hague Convention. 233   The problem for Landrieu, 
Bartholet, and other advocates is that the Hague Convention, 
with its preference for in-country adoption, no longer 
accommodates the increasing appetite for international 
adoption.  Whitney Reitz, the State Department employee 
who orchestrated the expedited removal of children from 
Haiti, later reportedly stated of the operation, “[t]he idea was 
to help the kids.  And if we overlooked Hague, I don’t think 
I’m going to apologize.”234  That attitude is common among 
adoption advocates.  For example, Craig Juntunen adopted 
three children from Haiti following the earthquake and later 
established the Both Ends Burning campaign, which 
produced the documentary, Stuck.235  He has since proposed a 
clearinghouse model to circumvent Hague Convention 
safeguards to make international adoption speedier and more 
prevalent.236 
The tension within international adoption comes in the 
framing of an issue that puts family rights on one side and 
benefits to orphans on the other.237  But tempering that is the 
fact that the courts do not recognize a prospective parent’s 
corresponding right to adopt as superior to the best interests 
of the child. 238   In fact, the interests of the prospective 
adoptive parents have been held to be subordinate to the 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106–279, § 102(e), 114 Stat. 
828 (Oct. 6, 2000) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14912(e)); JOYCE, supra note 16, at 
221. 
 234. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 3. 
 235. Voigt, supra note 5.  Stuck documented several adoption experiences in 
Vietnam, Ethiopia, and Haiti.  Id. 
 236. Id.  Juntunen seeks to raise levels of international adoptions in the 
United States to 50,000 children a year with a nine-month waiting time.  Id. 
 237. QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 9. 
 238. Briggs & Marre, supra note 183, at 5; see also Mullins v. Oregon, 57 
F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Whatever claim a prospective adoptive parent 
may have to a child, we are certain that it does not rise to the level of a 
fundamental liberty interest.”); Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 
131 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e are constrained to conclude that there is no 
fundamental right to adopt.”). 
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state’s interest.239  It is a process that comes with “messy 
contradictions,” in that the supposed client—the child, whose 
best interest is always to prevail—is not the paying client.240  
Instead, as the current baby markets reflect, the needs of the 
adult prevail as the secondary client who gets to make the 
choices.241 
Nevertheless, prospective parents understand that 
adoption into homes cannot happen without them and thus 
equate their desire to adopt as the fulfillment of the child’s 
right to the home they deserve.  This leads to a sense of 
entitlement; Americans routinely refer to children in other 
countries as “their” children, as if they have a superior claim 
to them than the domestic state, and lament that the process 
takes so long to bring them “home.” 242   When the State 
Department shuts adoption in a country for reasons of fraud 
and corruption, Americans blame the United States for 
“interfering” with the adoption of the children on which they 
had sets their sights, as if the United States is the bad actor 
for requiring a transparent process as called for by the Hague 
Convention.243  
The reality is that international adoption helps only a 
handful of children, leaving the needs of the majority of 
children in sending nations unaddressed. 244   What is 
happening is a continuing shift in the adoption paradigm 
from a focus on the best interests of the child to a demand 
from Western couples who seek children “for their own sense 
of fulfillment,” 245  and who will go to great lengths and 
expense to “match the kind of family they’re trying to 
 
 239. Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1468–69 & n.270 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order 
to protect the interests of minor children.”)). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Sara Dorow, Producing Kinship Through the Marketplaces of 
Transnational Adoption, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF 
CREATING FAMILIES 73 (Michele Bratcher Goodwin ed., 2010) (citing Family 
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application of ‘best interests.”). 
 242. Voigt, supra note 5. 
 243. HOWELL, supra note 1, at 139. 
 244. QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 26. 
 245. Gill Haworth et al., Infertility and Inter-Country Adoption, in ADOPTING 
AFTER INFERTILITY 135 (Marilyn Crawshaw & Rachel Balen eds., 2010); Briggs 
& Marre, supra note 183, at 1, 5; HOWELL, supra note 1, at 17–18, 20–21, 138, 
178. 
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create.”246  Statistics show that 95 percent of all orphans are 
over the age of five.247  Yet, Americans tend to adopt younger 
children, and prospective parents will spend over $60,000, 
and years on waiting lists—all to “save” children who 
sometimes have yet to be born.248 
2. Children in Families First Legislation 
Abandoning their former position that children would 
better be served by solving “the problems of social and 
economic injustice that prevent so many birth parents from 
being able to raise their children themselves,” 249  some 
advocates now argue that international adoption is the “most 
logical solution” to the “disparity between the number of 
abandoned and orphaned children in some countries and 
families and individuals wishing to adopt in others.” 250 
Indeed, they claim that the Hague protective protocols merely 
serve as a stumbling block to “saving” children.251  Thus, 
international adoption proponents push for even less 
regulation, alleging that Hague restrictions ultimately hurt 
children and cause them to spend their lives in orphanages 
where the “results are more developmental problems, more 
kids on the street and more cost to the government to 
institutionalize these kids.”252 
Viewing the reduced numbers of international adoption 
as a failure on the part of the government to meet the needs 
of children abroad,253 Senator Landrieu introduced legislation 
in the form of the Children in Families First Act of 2013254 
 
 246. Ko, supra note 16. 
 247. Press Release: UNICEF, supra note 209. 
 248. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 8; Ko, supra note 16.  The United States 
Bureau of Consular Affairs reports that adoption service providers charged 
prospective parents up to $64,357 for processing intercountry adoptions in 2014, 
with half costing more than $31,120.  FY 2014 Annual Report on Intercountry 
Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 31, 2015), http://travel.state.gov/content/d 
am/aa/pdfs/fy2014_annual_report.pdf [hereinafter FY 2014 Annual Report]. 
 249. Bartholet, Black Children, supra note 152, at 97. 
 250. See Selman, supra note 6, at 97. 
 251. Voigt & Brown, supra note 209; Voigt, supra note 5. 
 252. Voigt, supra note 5; BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 165.  
But see supra notes 213–14 regarding how demand for children is creating 
“orphans.” 
 253. Children in Families First: FAQ’S, http://childreninfamiliesfirst.org/chif 
f-faqs/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).  “The sad reality is that [international 
adoption] is declining because international adoption has wrongly been forced 
off the table of appropriate permanency options for children.”  Id. 
 254. Children in Families First Act of 2013 [hereinafter 2013 CHIFF], S. 
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and the Children in Families First Act of 2014255 (collectively, 
CHIFF).  Drafted by Whitney Reitz, the former State 
Department employee who worked around the Hague 
Convention to bring the Haitian children to the United 
States,256 CHIFF focused on every child’s “human right to a 
family,” and promised to reclaim the role in international 
child welfare that it said the government had “effectively 
relinquished” to UNICEF.257  It proposed to create a new 
office within the State Department, along with a new 
Ambassador position, 258 that it said would streamline the 
processing of inter-country adoption cases to “allow 
international adoptions to become a strong and important 
part of how we protect children.”259  With growing bipartisan 
support and endorsements by groups such as Craig 
Juntunen’s Both Ends Burning (BEB), Christian 
organizations like Saddleback Church, the Southern Baptist 
Convention (SBC), and Christian Alliance for Orphans 
(CAFO), and many adoption agencies,260 the bill sought to 
help improve the lives of the estimated “200 million orphans 
in the world.”261 
But in reframing the practice of international adoption as 
 
1530, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Children in Families First Act of 2013, H.R. 
3323, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 255. Children in Families First Act of 2014 [hereinafter 2014 CHIFF], S. 
2475, 113th Cong. (2014); see also Children in Families First Act of 2014, H.R. 
4143, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 256. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.  Reitz announced that she 
had been hired by Sen. Landrieu to draft the legislation.  Whitney Reitz, 
Address at Pepperdine Law School, Nootbaar Institute on Intercountry 
Adoption: Orphan Rescue or Child Trafficking? (Feb. 8, 2013). 
 257. Children in Families First: Messaging Points, http://childreninfamilie 
sfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/CHIFF-Messaging-Points.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2014) [hereinafter CHIFF: Messaging Points]. 
 258. The 2013 CHIFF version established a Bureau of Vulnerable Children 
and Family Security, with an Assistant Secretary position. 2013 CHIFF, S. 
1530.  The 2014 CHIFF version changed the name to the Office of Vulnerable 
Children and Family Security. 2014 CHIFF, S. 2475. 
 259. CHIFF: Messaging Points, supra note 257. 
 260. Children in Families First: Legislation, 
http://childreninfamiliesfirst.org/legislation-chiff/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) 
[hereinafter CHIFF: Legislation]. 
 261. Id.  Landrieu drastically reduced that number in May 2014. “By some 
estimates, there are over 150 million orphans in the world.”  Children in 
Families First: One Pager, http://childreninfamiliesfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Children-in-Families-First-one-pager-2014-05-8.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2014).  See also supra notes 208–14 and accompanying text 
regarding the inflated number of orphans. 
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every child’s right to have a permanent family, the proposed 
legislation operated to make more international children 
available for adoption to Americans.262  CHIFF imported the 
“concurrent planning” concept championed by Professor 
Bartholet 263  and put it on equal footing with the Hague 
subsidiarity principle: 
The principle of subsidiarity, which gives preference to in-
country solutions, should be implemented within the 
context of a concurrent planning strategy, exploring in- and 
out-of-country options simultaneously.  If an in-country 
placement serving the child’s best interest and providing 
appropriate, protective, and permanent care is not quickly 
available, and such an international home is available, the 
child should be placed in that international home without 
delay.264 
In fact, just days before Senator Landrieu introduced 
CHIFF in the Senate, Prof. Bartholet advanced this same 
position: 
[T]he United States could advocate for an appropriate 
definition of Hague subsidiarity, namely one that prefers 
in-country adoption only when it can be accomplished with 
no delay in placement. Subsidiarity should be defined and 
limited by a Concurrent Planning strategy, in which 
countries plan simultaneously both for domestic and 
international adoption, preferring domestic over 
international placement only when an equally qualified 
domestic home is immediately available.265 
But this is not consistent with the Hague Convention’s 
subsidiarity principle—which is sequential, not 
simultaneous—and looks to international adoption as a last 
resort, after all possibilities of domestic adoption and other 
forms of in-country care have been exhausted.266  Rather, it 
was an attempt to force concurrent planning as a best 
practice—what is not even required by half of U.S. states—
into international adoption, so that more children would be 
 
 262. See 2014 CHIFF, S. 2475; 2013 CHIFF, S. 1530. 
 263. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 264. 2014 CHIFF, S. 2475; 2013 CHIFF, S. 1530 (emphasis added). 
 265. Elizabeth Bartholet, The Hague Convention: Pros, Cons and Potential, 
at 5, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/PepperdineBk 
HagueTrack9-5-13.pdf  (emphasis added) (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  Bartholet 
suggested that proponents advocate that international adoption “trumps all in-
country placement options save for adoption.”  Id. 
 266. See Hague Convention, supra note 3. 
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available for adoption.267 
In many respects, CHIFF mimicked the failed Families 
for Orphans Act (FFAO).268  Introduced in 2009 by Senator 
Landrieu and Republican co-sponsor James Inhofe, and 
drafted by the Families for Orphans Coalition (most of whose 
members also serve as the CHIFF Executive Working 
Committee),269 the bill conditioned United States foreign aid 
on a country’s willingness to allow the international adoption 
of its children as part of the effort to secure “permanent” 
homes for orphans.270  Under the guise that “all children 
belong in families,”271 the bill provided a means to facilitate 
thousands of additional international adoptions through a 
new office that would be created within the State 
Department. 272   Countries receiving aid were required to 
conduct a biennial orphan census, and offered “additional 
financial incentives, including technical assistance, grants, 
trade, and debt relief” in exchange for sending “their children 
abroad for international adoption.”273  Despite the bipartisan 
effort, the bill was not passed.274 
Critics stated that CHIFF, much like its failed 
predecessor, actually aimed to tie foreign assistance to a 
country’s willingness to participate in intercountry adoption 
for the benefit of Americans who want to adopt. 275   As 
recently as 2012, as part of a CAFO Summit panel276 at Rick 
 
 267. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 222, at 2. 
 268. See Families for Orphans Act, S. 1458, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 269. Id.  The Coalition was led by former Joint Council on International 
Children’s Services President Tom DiFilipo, National Council for Adoption 
President Chuck Johnson, and America World Adoption agency founder Brian 
Luwis.  Id.  Some of these same members, including Joint Council on 
International Children’s Services and National Council for Adoption, also 
served on the CHIFF Executive Working Committee, alongside Saddleback 
Church, Christian Alliance for Orphans, and Both Ends Burning, among others.  
See CHIFF: Legislation, supra note 260. 
 270. See Families for Orphans Act, S. 1458, 111th Cong. (2009).  Specifically, 
the bill sought to “ensure that all aid efforts receiving funding from the United 
States recognize and support the need for the preservation and reunification of 
families and the provision of permanent parental care for orphans.”  Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id.  The bill created the Office for Orphan Policy, Diplomacy and 
Development.  Id. 
 273. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 225–26 (quoting adoption reform group, 
Ethica). 
 274. Id. at 227. 
 275. Id. at 225–26. 
 276. The panel also included former FFOA drafters Chuck Johnson and 
Brian Luwis, as well as former Congressional Coalition on Adoption Institute 
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Warren’s Saddleback Church, one of the former FFAO 
drafters, Tom DiFilipo, continued to herald the idea of tying 
foreign aid to international adoption. 277   Suggesting that 
funding should be limited to countries that had an express 
policy that “all children belong in families,” DiFilipo urged 
adopting families to “demand, not ask for or suggest, that the 
US government establish a policy that children belong in 
families.  I’m talking about international aid money, 
whatever it is related to.”278 He denigrated efforts to promote 
“family preservation . . . by building schools or putting in 
water wells”—work that enhanced domestic infrastructure 
and reduced the need for international adoption—as 
alternative forms of orphan care not based on permanency 
policy.279 
However, tying federal aid to a country’s willingness to 
deliver its children for adoption is treating children as a 
commodity.  And reframing a country’s desire to care for its 
own children, or to improve efforts to comply with the Hague 
Convention, as a failure to help children belies adoption 
proponents’ true critique, that countries are cutting off the 
supply that we demand, and feeds the neocolonialist 
arguments that claim international adoption serves the 
interests of privileged families from wealthy nations at the 
expense of the poorest.280  While child abandonment arguably 
provides both a moral and legal basis for adoption, recent 
adoption narratives strongly suggest that international 
adoption increasingly involves the adoption of children 
procured from living parents, oftentimes by nefarious 
practices.281  And it comes at a tremendous social cost to 
 
Executive Director Kathleen Strottman, former staffer to Senator Landrieu.  Id. 
at 224. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 9, at 1465 (citing Twila Perry, 
Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierarchy, Race, and 
Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 105 (1998) (urging 
advocates of international adoption to address history of colonialism, cultural 
imperialism, and economic exploitation that lead poor women in poor countries 
to give their children to privileged women in Western nations)). 
 281. E.J. Graff, The Lie We Love, FOREIGN POL’Y Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 58, 63 
(detailing accounts of babies stolen from mothers, mothers forced into giving 
away their babies because they cannot pay inflated hospital bills, and child 
finders who purchased, defrauded, coerced, or stole children from their 
families). 
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women who do not have the means to care for their children 
in their own country.282  If every child has a “right to a loving 
home,” as international advocates and policymakers insist, 
that should include the children’s right to live in their country 
of origin with their birth families, not just in the family that 
is willing to pay upwards of $60,000 or more for them.283  
Instead, poverty has caused thousands of poor unmarried 
women to abandon or relinquish their children for 
international adoption.284 
A true social initiative should include “[s]upporting 
families and communities so that they can look after their 
children themselves [so that] not only are individual children 
more likely to thrive and go on to be better parents, they are 
more likely to contribute to their communities and to their 
country’s development.”285  For example, a mother in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia could remain united with her child for $15 
per month.286  Institutionalization would not be a concern, 
and Americans would not have to spend upwards of $60,000 
to “save” an “orphan.”  Instead, poor mothers have become 
providers of children for parents in wealthier countries, as 
biological and community ties are forever severed and a 
billion dollar, unregulated adoption industry is fed, all in the 
“best interests” of the child and to fulfill “their right” to a 
loving home.287  Once again, the best interests standard has 
been co-opted to serve white interests through international 
adoption.288 
 
 282. Roby et al., supra note 2, at 4 (citing poverty as the leading cause of 
“rescue”—driven desire to adopt internationally). 
 283. See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text. 
 284. Maureen McCauley Evans, Poverty Alone Should Never Be a Reason for 
Adoption, LIGHT OF DAY STORIES BLOG (July 14, 2014), 
http://lightofdaystories.com/2014/07/14/poverty-alone-should-never-be-a-reason-
for-adoption/; Gossett, supra note 173, at 870, 872–73. 
 285. Harrop, supra note 15 (quoting Save the Children International Chief 
Executive Jasmine Whitbread). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Roby et al., supra note 2, at 3, 5–6; Voigt, supra note 5 (citing Susan 
Soonkeum Cox). 
 288. See O’Neill, supra note 8 (quoting Roots Adoption Agency CEO Toni 
Oliver).  The high cost of adoption has left black families out of a process 
dominated by whites, so the children are being adopted into primarily white 
homes.  Id. 
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III. STRUCTURAL RACISM AGAINST BLACK AMERICAN 
CHILDREN 
Today, nearly twenty years after the Multiethnic 
Placement Act sought to eliminate race considerations in 
public placements, race still matters in adoption.  As adoption 
expert Ellen Herman suggests, “Our history continues to 
plague us.”289  Even the language used to classify adoptions 
shows an ingrained preference that reflects historical 
traditions.290  The adoption of white children by white parents 
is still considered “traditional” while the adoption of any 
black child is dubbed a “minority” adoption.291  Reminiscent of 
Plessy, biracial children and those with even “one drop” of 
black blood are considered legally black and therefore 
classified a minority.292 
A. The Plight of Black American Children in Foster Care 
It is indisputable that supply and demand drives the 
domestic adoption industry; the price depends on the child’s 
“market rating, with the cost for a white child being 
significantly higher than that for an American minority 
child.”293  Indeed, the “adoption hierarchy reflects our society” 
as many private agencies still operate under a shifting fee 
structure that follows “historical race-conscious indicators” 
and commands a higher premium for children that rank 
higher on the “desirability list.”294  Children are ranked—with 
corresponding monetary values—by racial and gender 
 
 289. Glaser, supra note 18; Jeff Gammage, For Adoptees, Racial Divide Still 
Wide; Families May be Colorblind, but the World is Not. It’s a Painful Lesson for 
Many, PHILLY.COM (May 8, 2006), http://articles.philly.com/2006-05-
08/news/25400162_1_race-and-adoption-transracial-adoption-white-families. 
 290. Dawn Davenport, Born in America, Adopted Abroad, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1027/p11s01-
lifp.html. 
 291. Andrew Morrison, Transracial Adoption: The Pros and Cons and the 
Parents’ Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 167, 179 (2004). 
 292. Howe, supra note 1, at 89 (citing Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the 
Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 592, 593 (2007)). 
 293. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 2 (citing Smolin, Child Trafficking, supra note 
18, at 323); BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at xx. 
 294. Six Words: Black Babies Cost Less To Adopt, NPR (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/06/27/195967886/six-words-black-babies-cost-less-to-
adopt  [hereinafter Six Words]; O’Neill, supra note 8 (quoting Adoption-Link 
director Margaret Fleming); Davenport, supra note 290; Goodwin, supra note 1, 
at 6. 
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preference, with blonde, blue-eyed girls at the top, black boys 
at the bottom, and biracial children in between.295 
Agencies claim that placing differing valuations on 
children of different races is not racism.296  Instead, they 
justify the inequitable practice by claiming that the reduced 
fees are necessary to incentivize the adoption of black 
children who otherwise might not be adopted.297  Agencies 
claim they “have to work much harder to find homes for our 
African-American babies.”298  But experts say this rationale is 
illogical.  “If placing white children is far easier than placing 
black babies, it would seem that less work would result in less 
pay and lower fees.” And, if true, it sheds light on an 
American society that, despite its color-blind rhetoric, still 
values—and segregates—children according to their skin 
color, even before they are born.299 
Nearly thirty-five years ago, Elisabeth Landes and 
Richard Posner performed an economic analysis of the then-
contemporary “baby market” in the United States and found 
that the shortage of white babies was leading to “baby 
selling.”300  They compared foster children, many of whom 
were black, to the unwanted and unsold inventory in 
warehouses. 301   Even though their research was well-
grounded in empirical statistics, it nevertheless received 
strong backlash because it referred to children in terms of 
supply and demand.302  To many, using market terms to refer 
to children was seen as reducing their value to that of a mere 
commodity and was akin to “putting a child on an auction 
 
 295. Six Words, supra note 294.  Adoption fees commonly range from $35,000 
to $40,000 for white children, while the cost to adopt a black child is generally 
less than half that, anywhere from $10,000 to $18,000.  Biracial children fall 
somewhere in between.  Id.; see also Goodwin, supra note 1, at 6 (listing as little 
as $4,000 for black children compared to $50,000 for healthy white infants); 
QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 5 (describing a three-tier pricing system with whites 
at the top, “honorary whites” in between, and black at the bottom); O’Neill, 
supra note 8 (citing Adoption-Link agency director Margaret Fleming); Glaser, 
supra note 18. 
 296. Six Words, supra note 294. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Davenport, supra note 290. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Elisabeth Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby 
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978). 
 301. Martha Ertman, The Upside of Baby Markets, in BABY MARKETS: 
MONEY AND THE NEW POLITICS OF CREATING FAMILIES 27 (Michele Bratcher 
Goodwin ed., 2010). 
 302. Goodwin, supra note 1, at xi–xiii, 4–5. 
2015] IGNORING THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE 309 
block,” which renewed negative images of slavery.303 
A “vast array of social policies going back to the 
institution of slavery can be characterized as responsible for 
the fact that it is black families whose children are 
disproportionately available for adoption and white families 
who are disproportionately in a position to seek adoption.”304  
The growing income gap between white and black 
Americans 305  ensures that, while no longer prohibited de 
jure, 306  the majority of blacks are now de facto non-
participant prospective parents in the adoption process, while 
whites dominate the adoption marketplace.307  But even as 
many whites employ the color-blind rhetoric of a post-racial 
society, and say race no longer matters, many choose not to 
adopt black American children, even though there is plenty of 
supply and the cost to adopt is less.308  Indeed, many purport 
to be colorblind in their approach to adoption simply because 
they adopt a child of color from another nation.309 
The large Christian evangelical orphan care and adoption 
movement has emerged as the embodiment of a post-racial 
approach to adoption.310  Many Christian evangelicals have 
heeded the Southern Baptist Convention’s (SBC) call to its 16 
million members to become involved in some form of 
adoption. 311   Committed to “defending the cause of the 
fatherless,” the movement sees international adoption as 
missional, i.e., a means to fulfill the “Great Commission” of 
bringing the gospel to “all nations, tribes, peoples, and 
tongues,”312 as they save hundreds of millions of orphans.313  
The movement’s marriage of fundamentalism with the social 
 
 303. Id. at xi–xiii; Ertman, supra note 301, at 27. 
 304. Bartholet, Black Children, supra note 152, at 1232.  “Taking all these 
perspectives together, transracial adoption can be characterized, and indeed has 
been by the NABSW and others, as one of the ultimate forms of exploitation by 
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 305. See supra note 122.  
 306. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 307. Howe, supra note 1, at 88. 
 308. See supra notes 293–99 and accompanying text. 
 309. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 72–73; QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 79–80. 
 310. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 55–56, 72–73. 
 311. Russell Moore, Reflections on Adopting for Life 2010, MOORE TO THE 
POINT (Mar. 4, 2010 7:10 AM), http://www.russellmoore.com/2010/03/04/reflecti 
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 312. Revelation 7:9–10 (New King James). 
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gospel has led to the mass adoption of children from 
developing nations, most recently from Africa (and from 
countries which are not members of the Hague 
Convention).314 
Preaching colorblindness and “a God who doesn’t see 
race,” the movement has led to the creation of “rainbow 
congregations,” such as SBC leader and Adopted for Life 
author Russell Moore’s former church, where members 
adopted 140 children from other nations.315  The result is a 
unique diversification within the very churches that 
“defended segregation just over a generation ago.”316  But as 
one political science scholar noted, it is not an integration 
based on participants of equal footing; rather, it is a 
noticeably white movement of “imported diversity,” where 
most of the color shows up in the black faces of children who 
have been adopted into white congregations.317  However, by 
not “talking to black adults, who may have endured the 
effects of the church’s institutional bias [and] instead by 
adopting children from other races and cultures,” 318  the 
 
 314. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 136. 
 315. Id. at 42–43, 71, 136; RUSSELL MOORE, ADOPTED FOR LIFE: THE 
PRIORITY OF ADOPTION FOR CHRISTIAN FAMILIES & CHURCHES (2009). 
 316. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 69, 73; see also Russell D. Moore, Black and 
White and Red All Over: Why Racial Justice Is a Gospel Issue, MOORE TO THE 
POINT BLOG (June 12, 2012), http://www.russellmoore.com/2012/06/12/black-
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 317. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 69.  Held May 2013, the 2500 attendees at 
CAFO’s Summit 9, the largest evangelical gathering for those committed to the 
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strollers and some black guest speakers.  Moore, Juntunen, and Sen. Landrieu 
spoke at Summit 9, and it is where Sen. Landrieu first announced that she 
would be introducing the CHIFF legislation.  Jedd Medefind, Major Orphan 
Legislation Introduced in U.S. Senate, CHRISTIAN ALLIANCE FOR ORPHANS 
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.christianalliancefororphans.org/blog/2013/09/19/ma 
jor-orphan-legislation-introduced-in-u-s-senate/. 
 318. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 71, 73.  “Through the civil rights period and 
beyond, sectors of the convention remained thickly entwined with white 
supremacy and segregation, though in recent years, it has made efforts to move 
past its history—for instance, drafting a 1995 resolution apologizing to all 
African-Americans for once espousing slavery.  Still, the evangelical 
denomination remains quite white and Southern: 80 percent of its 16 million 
members are white and 90 percent are concentrated in the South and Texas.”  
Norton, supra note 316. 
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progress ensured is the continued subordination of blacks, as 
African children are ripped from their families and 
communities of origin to grow up in white families in a 
country with unsettled issues on the black race.319  Yet, many 
white adoptive parents are seemingly not aware of or 
overlook this facet as they satisfy their own desires to adopt. 
The problem with white privilege is that it leads to white 
normativity and entitlement under the status quo.320  White 
prospective parents believe they have a right to adopt 
whomever they choose from wherever they choose, even as 
children in the United States are overlooked and remain in 
foster care. 321   This is evidenced when parents routinely 
bypass the Hague and its subsidiarity principle, which 
requires parents to adopt children in need of homes in their 
own country before adopting internationally. As one agency 
director bluntly stated, “There is no shortage of American 
families willing to adopt. There is a shortage of American 
families willing to adopt these kids.”322  Put bluntly, black 
American children are simply not in demand by white 
American parents. Despite current color-blind rhetoric, 
Americans attach social constructs to race.  Some scholars 
have argued that white America still clings to “transnational 
racial imagery,” which has produced a perception in the 
American mindset of black American children with seemingly 
insurmountable childhoods.323  Thus, children from overseas 
 
 319. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 71, 73. 
 320. For example, Moore diminished the sometimes traumatic experiences 
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Glaser, supra note 18 (The “false assumptions about crack deepened white 
America’s reluctance to adopt black children” from foster care). 
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are seemingly more desirable to adopt than black American 
children in foster care. 324   Even CAFO President Jedd 
Medefind suggested that it is sometimes seen as more “exotic” 
to adopt children from the other side of the world than “the 
other side of the tracks,”325 echoing the observation of one 
adoption scholar that, “[O]ur society is more open to 
international adoptions of other races than it is to domestic 
[transracial adoptions].” 326   As one adoption attorney 
summed, “Americans like to think our society is colorblind, 
but it isn’t.”327  Indeed, many parents will wait years for a 
foreign child that sometimes has yet to be born rather than 
adopt a black child in American foster care that needs an 
immediate home.328 
Even the most ardent proponents of international 
adoption cannot deny that black American children are not 
finding homes in this country.329  Professor Bartholet once 
championed interracial adoption as a means of reclaiming 
children from foster care.330  The fact is that black American 
children experience lower rates of adoption from foster care 
than other races and age out disproportionately. 331   The 
United States foster care system is home to 402,378 children, 
including 101,840 children who currently await adoption.332  
Although blacks make up only 14 percent of the total United 
States population, 333  black children are disproportionately 
 
 324. Glaser, supra note 18 (citing Emory University’s Fetal Alcohol Center 
Director Claire Coles); Dorow, supra note 241, at 71; see supra notes 312–17 and 
accompanying text. 
 325. JOYCE, supra note 16, at 235; see also Gossett, supra note 173, at 858–
62 (explaining how Angelina Jolie’s international adoptions inspired emulation 
and influenced current attitudes towards international adoptions). 
 326. Morrison, supra note 291, at 179 (citing telephone interview with 
University of Texas Professor and Associate Dean of Research Ruth G. McRoy). 
 327. Glaser, supra note 18 (quoting international adoption attorney Steven 
Kirsh). 
 328. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 8; Ko, supra note 16. 
 329. See Perry, supra note 133, at 82–83 (observing that even as advocates 
push for less regulation to allow more international adoptions, black American 
children are languishing in foster care and aging out at increased rates). 
 330. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. 
 331. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN 
FOSTER CARE 10, 17 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081064t.pdf. 
 332. 2014 AFCARS Report, supra note 10, at 1. 
 333. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE BLACK 
POPULATION: 2010, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.  This figure includes 
black alone, or in combination with one or more other races. For black alone, the 
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overrepresented in foster care in nearly every state in the 
nation and remain in foster care longer than children of other 
races.334 
Further, approximately 20,000 children emancipate each 
year from foster care unadopted.335  Even as recent headlines 
tout that the United States foster care population is 
shrinking, the number of children who age out of the system 
has steadily increased, from 3.1 percent in 1998 to the 
current rate of 10 percent.336  For example, in Delaware, a 
state with a total black population of just over 20 percent, 
56.7 percent of the children aging out of foster care were 
black.337  Of those that age out of the system, many are 
unlikely to graduate high school or attain a college degree.338  
Most face dismal futures of incarcerations, unplanned 
pregnancies, and homelessness. 339  A recent study showed 
 
population stands at thirteen percent.  Id. 
 334. See ALICIA SUMMERS ET AL., PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILD. DEP’T 
OF THE NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, 
DISPROPORTIONALITY RATES FOR CHILDREN OF COLOR IN FOSTER CARE 3–4, 8 
(2012), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/Disproportionality%2 
0Rates%20for%20Children%20of%20Color%202010.pdf; Cynthia Gordy, The 
Root: Helping Kids After Foster Care Ends, NPR (May 10, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/05/10/136166653/the-root-helping-kids-after-foster-
care-ends.  See also 2014 AFCARS Report, supra note 10, at 2, 4.  Black 
children made up twenty-four percent both of the total foster care population 
and the children waiting for adoption in 2013.  Id. 
 335. 2014 AFCARS Report, supra note 10, at 3 (showing 23,090 children aged 
out of foster care in 2013). 
 336. Id.; see also THE PEW CHARITABLE  TRUSTS, TIME FOR REFORM: AGING 
OUT AND ON THEIR OWN; MORE TEENS LEAVING FOSTER CARE WITHOUT A 
PERMANENT FAMILY 1 (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFi 
les/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Foster_care_reform/Kids_are_Waiting_TimeforRe
form0307.pdf. 
 337. JULIA O’HANLON ET AL., U. DEL.’S INST. FOR PUB. ADMIN., “AGING OUT” 
OF FOSTER CARE: BACKGROUND AND RESOURCES BRIEF 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.ipa.udel.edu/publications/AgingOut_policybrief.pdf; 2010 Census 
Interactive Population Search: Delaware, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=10. 
 338. MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., CHAPIN HALL AT U. OF CHI., MIDWEST 
EVALUATION OF THE ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: 
OUTCOMES AT AGE 26 1 (2011), available at http://chapinhall.org/sites/default/fi 
les/Midwest%20Evaluation_Report_4_10_12.pdf. 
 339. Id.; SARA MCCARTHY & MARK GLADSTONE, CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF 
RESEARCH, POLICY MATTERS 7–8 (2011), available at http://www.sor.govo 
ffice3.com/vertical/Sites/%7B3BDD1595-792B-4D20-8D44-626EF05648C7%7D/u 
ploads/Foster_Care_PDF_12-8-11.pdf.  The California Senate Office of Research 
surveyed the California prison population and found that blacks made up the 
largest percentage of those who had previously been in foster care, even though 
blacks account for only six percent of the state’s population.  Id.; Dan Walters, 
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that, “on average, for every young person who ages out of 
foster care, taxpayers and communities pay $300,000 in social 
costs like public assistance, incarceration, and lost wages to a 
community over that person’s lifetime . . . almost $8 billion in 
social costs to the United States every year.”340 
B. The Exportation of Black American Children 
Even as international adoption proponents suggest that 
wealthy nations like the United States have the means to 
help children in underdeveloped countries through 
international adoption, many are unaware that the United 
States is also shipping its children abroad for adoption.341  
Most of the children are black or biracial, and most are being 
sent to Canada, although recent years have seen an increase 
in children being sent to the Netherlands and Ireland.342  
Many are private adoptions; adoption agencies also advertise 
programs specifically geared to the foreign adoption of 
children from U.S. foster care, noting that foreign parents 
will have an easier time adopting “children who are not 
Caucasian.”343 It is a trend that is not highlighted, with some 
fearing that drawing attention to the fact that black children 
are being adopted by white foreigners will trigger the same 
backlash that happened with NABSW and transracial 
adoption in the 1970s.344 
 
California’s Black Population Shrinking Proportionately, SACRAMENTO BEE 
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 340. Stangler, supra note 6; JIM CASEY YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES INITIATIVE, 
ISSUE BRIEF: COST AND AVOIDANCE, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR INVESTING IN 
YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER CARE (2013), available at 
http://jimcaseyyouth.org/sites/default/files/Cost%20Avoidance%20Issue%20Brief
_EMBARGOED%20until%20May%206.pdf. 
 341. Mirah Riben, American Babies Exported for Adoption, DISSIDENT VOICE 
(Aug. 29, 2012), http://dissidentvoice.org/2012/08/american-babies-exported-for-
adoption/; QUIROZ, supra note 134, at 4. 
 342. Sophie Brown, Overseas Adoptions Rise – for Black American Children, 
CNN (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/world/international-
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 343. Adoption of US-Born Children By Non-US Citizens - Approved in 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands, ILLIEN ADOPTIONS INT’L, 
http://www.illienadoptions.org/non-us_citizens.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 344. Howe, supra note 1, at 88 (citing Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Redefining the 
Transracial Adoption Controversy, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 131 (Spring 
1995)); Sheila M. Poole, Canadians Look South to Adopt Black Kids, ATLANTA 
J.-CONST. (Aug. 24, 2004).  According to Holt International Children’s Service 
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Official records show that 446 American children have 
been adopted abroad since the United States ratified the 
Hague Convention in 2008. 345   Before then, the federal 
government did not track the number of American children 
adopted internationally, 346  but investigative reports 
discovered that the United States was sending hundreds of 
children to Canada. 347   Because the Hague’s subsidiarity 
principle requires that every effort be made to place children 
domestically before resort to international adoption, it was 
expected that it would be harder to place American children 
abroad when the regulations were finally implemented.348  
But official State Department figures show that the number 
of American children sent internationally for adoption has 
 
spokeswoman, Susan Soonkeum Cox, “They are not in the sunshine.”  Glaser, 
supra note 18. 
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legislation.” 146 Cong. Rec. S8866–04 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2000).  Official reports 
show that twenty-five American children were adopted abroad in 2008, twenty-
six in 2009, fourty-three in 2010, seventy-three in 2011, ninety-nine in 2012, 
eighty-four in 2013, and ninety-six in 2014.  See infra notes 352–56 and 
accompanying text. 
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President Tom Atwood and U.S. Department of State spokeswoman Kelly 
Shannon); Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption; Intercountry Adoption 
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Convention Records, 68 F. REG. 54064 (proposed Sept. 15, 2003).  It was not 
until the Hague Convention was ratified and the central adoption authority was 
created, that the State Department was directed to establish a case registry and 
report each child that was sent or received through intercountry adoption, 
whether from a Convention country or not.  IAA, § 102(e), 114 Stat. 828; 
104(b)(2), 114 Stat. 829 (Oct. 6, 2000) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14914(b)(2)). 
 347. See Peter Selman, Trends in Intercountry Adoption: Analysis of Data 
from 20 Receiving Countries, 19982004, 23 J. POPULATION RES. 183 (2006); 
Lesley Stahl, Black Babies “Exported?”, 60 MINUTES (June 14, 2006), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=673611n.; Cheryl Corley, Foreign 
Adoption of African-American Babies Grows, NPR (July 17, 2005), 
http://www.wbur.org/npr/4726046/foreign-adoption-of-african-american-babies-
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 348. O’Neill, supra note 8.  As a result, parents from Europe and Canada 
adopted a large number of American black children just prior to 2008 in a rush 
to adopt before “the gates shut.”  Id. 
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actually increased nearly 300 percent in the years since 
Hague ratification. 349   Other countries report that the 
increase is closer to 1,000 percent.350  According to Prof. Peter 
Selman, international adoption expert and statistical adviser 
to the Hague Convention, receiving countries report a much 
higher number of American children than the United States 
claims it sends, suggesting that the number of minority 
children sent abroad is underreported.351 
For example, official United States reports show that 
Canada has received only 179 American children since 
ratification.352  However, Canada’s central authority reports 
that it received 189 children from the United States in 2008, 
253 children in 2009, and 220 children in 2011, a total of 662 
children in just those three years, more than triple the 
reported six-year total of 179 children the United States 
claims it sent to Canada since 2008.353  Likewise, the United 
States reports that it sent 180 American children to the 
Netherlands in the last six years. 354   Yet, the central 
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Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 2013), http://travel.state.gov/content/da 
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2013 Annual Report on Intercountry Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 2014), 
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 353. Selman, Pepperdine Address, supra note 350. 
 354. The United States reports that it sent twenty-one children to the 
Netherlands in 2008, seventeen children in 2009, eighteen in 2010, twenty-
seven in 2011, twenty-eight in 2012, thirty-eight in 2013, and thirty-one in 
2014.  FY 2008 Annual Report, supra note 352; FY 2009 Annual Report, supra 
note 352; FY 2010 Annual Report, supra note 352; FY 2011 Annual Report, 
supra note 352; FY 2012 Annual Report, supra note 352; FY 2013 Annual 
Report, supra note 352; FY 2014 Annual Report, supra note 248. 
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authority of the Netherlands reports that it received fifty-six 
children from the United States in 2008, thirty-four children 
in 2009, and forty-three in 2011, a total of 133 children in just 
those three years and more than double the amount claimed 
by the United States.355  Similarly, Ireland reports receiving 
more American children than the number officially reported 
by the United States.356  As Professor Selman notes, it raises 
questions as to why the numbers are being underreported.357 
Although the actual outbound numbers, by any 
calculation, are a fraction of the incoming number of children, 
the question remains why the United States, one of the more 
wealthy nations in the world, allows the intercountry 
adoption of its minority children.358  It is ironic, given the 
United States’ position as one of the wealthiest nations in the 
world and its presumed commitment to domestic placement, 
that any of America’s black children can only find a home 
abroad.  The United States certainly does not fit the typical 
profile of a sending country.  “The nations that send children 
abroad for adoption are generally Third World countries 
convulsed by poverty and violence,” says Professor 
Bartholet.359  Twenty years ago, she suggested that: 
[s]ending children abroad for adoption tends to highlight 
rather than hide the fact that there are problems at home. 
Indeed, opposition to foreign adoption is based in large 
part on embarrassment within the sending countries over 
having their domestic problems revealed by this public 
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2010). 
 359. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 45.  As one professional 
summarized, it is “an embarrassment . . . that we cannot place our own 
children.”  See Stahl, supra note 347. 
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confession of inability to take care of their own children.360 
Racism is cited as the main reason that children in 
private adoptions are sent overseas, with some believing 
black or bi-racial children would be discriminated against in 
this country because of their race.361  It is prevalent enough to 
lead Adam Pertman, former Executive Director of the Evan 
B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, to say, “In the United 
States, as much as Americans want to believe it’s not true, we 
are still a country where there is at least some degree of 
racial prejudice.”362  “At the very least,” says one adoption 
professional, “the tiny exodus raises provocative questions in 
a nation used to seeing itself as a haven for international 
adoptees.  Americans adopt children from other countries 
because of war, famine or because they are boarded in 
orphanages. Why would we be exporting our kids?”363  It 
cannot be said that there are no available homes here, not 
when thousands of children are being brought into the 
country for adoption. 
CONCLUSION 
Decades ago, scholars decried a system that placed a 
premium on white infants and thus reduced black children to 
a lesser value.364  While the “best interests of children” should 
“always prevail over the special interests of the adults 
seeking to adopt them,”365 that standard cannot but lose some 
of its meaning when a category of children is systematically 
devalued based solely on skin color.  As one scholar noted, “If 
U.S. adoptions were primarily focused on child welfare and 
charity, rather than adult need and desire, the costs 
associated with adopting white children would not exceed 
that of black children,” and many more American children 
would find homes.366  And, whether the children are being 
imported into the country or exported out of it, the reality is 
that black children are “still commodities to be purchased and 
 
 360. BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS, supra note 4, at 152. 
 361. Id.  As told by one birth mother, “[t]here’s too much prejudice over here.”  
See Brown, supra note 342. 
 362. Brown, supra note 342. 
 363. O’Neill, supra note 8 (quoting Roots Adoption Agency CEO Toni Oliver). 
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 366. Id. at 8. 
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sold in a white-controlled marketplace.”367  Some adoption 
professionals have gone as far as to call the entire 
international adoption process “covert racism,” claiming that 
black families within the United States would like to adopt, 
but are once again left out of a process very much dominated 
by whites.368  And the debate boils down to whether adoption 
is really about the best interests of the child, “or is instead 
about the right of white people to parent whichever children 
they choose.”369  Exactly whose rights and which homes are 
being championed? 
Professor Ronald Dworkin once wrote that a government 
must “show equal concern for the fate” of all its citizens, 
noting that “it is important, from an objective point of view, 
that human lives be successful rather than wasted . . . .”370  
Black children in the American foster care system should not 
have to disproportionately age out because there are no 
available homes for them in this country.  Nor should the 
United States, once a haven for discarded children, be 
sending its black children abroad for adoption, then replacing 
them with children—of any color—from other nations.371 
The United States government should not be pushing 
legislation like the Children in Families First Act that acts to 
facilitate even more international adoptions to the detriment 
of children in this nation.  As a matter of public policy, the 
United States should abolish the current two-tiered system 
and not allow international adoptions from non-Hague 
countries.  Further, as a Hague member, the United States 
should enforce for all adoptions the Hague Convention’s 
proviso that allows international adoption only if all avenues 
for intra-country adoption have been exhausted and there are 
no children available for adoption within the United States.  
That means, consistent with the Hague’s subsidiarity 
requirement, the United States should not allow any 
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Pertman).  To encourage the adoption of United States-born children, one 
scholar proposed legislation that requires applicants to first seek to adopt a U.S. 
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international adoptions—whether to or from the United 
States—until all domestic placement efforts have been 
exhausted. 
Structural racism does not need a bad actor; instead it is 
facilitated by actions that are “not directly discriminatory but 
[have] a discriminatory effect, whether intended or not.”372  It 
is displayed in an adoption system that places a monetary 
premium on all other children but black American children 
and sends black children abroad for adoption so they can find 
a home outside of foster care. It is a problem that cannot be 
covered up with color-blind rhetoric and accepted post-racial 
theory, or even by bringing in children of color from other 
nations. It is time to take off the blinders.  “[W]e have to 
develop a global consciousness about what it is we’re doing,” 
says Richard Sullivan, an associate professor of social work 
and family studies at the University of British Columbia in 
Vancouver, while asking, “Why are kids in our own countries 
not moving towards permanency? . . . Let’s be more honest 
about what this really is.”373  Otherwise, the status quo will 
continue and “[t]he problem of the twenty-first century will be 
the problem of the color line. . . . By any standard of 
measurement or evaluation, the problem has not been solved 
in the twentieth century and thus becomes a part of the 
legacy and burden of the next century.”374 
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